Robert Fisk in the British Independent on the hanging of Saddam Hussein.
Saddam to the gallows. It was an easy equation. Who could be more deserving of that last walk to the scaffold - that crack of the neck at the end of a rope - than the Beast of Baghdad, the Hitler of the Tigris, the man who murdered untold hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqis while spraying chemical weapons over his enemies? Our masters will tell us in a few hours that it is a "great day" for Iraqis and will hope that the Muslim world will forget that his death sentence was signed - by the Iraqi "government", but on behalf of the Americans - on the very eve of the Eid al-Adha, the Feast of the Sacrifice, the moment of greatest forgiveness in the Arab world.
Robert Fisk: A dictator created then destroyed by America
Published: 30 December 2006
Saddam to the gallows. It was an easy equation. Who could be more deserving of that last walk to the scaffold - that crack of the neck at the end of a rope - than the Beast of Baghdad, the Hitler of the Tigris, the man who murdered untold hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqis while spraying chemical weapons over his enemies? Our masters will tell us in a few hours that it is a "great day" for Iraqis and will hope that the Muslim world will forget that his death sentence was signed - by the Iraqi "government", but on behalf of the Americans - on the very eve of the Eid al-Adha, the Feast of the Sacrifice, the moment of greatest forgiveness in the Arab world.
But history will record that the Arabs and other Muslims and, indeed, many millions in the West, will ask another question this weekend, a question that will not be posed in other Western newspapers because it is not the narrative laid down for us by our presidents and prime ministers - what about the other guilty men?
No, Tony Blair is not Saddam. We don't gas our enemies. George W Bush is not Saddam. He didn't invade Iran or Kuwait. He only invaded Iraq. But hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians are dead - and thousands of Western troops are dead - because Messrs Bush and Blair and the Spanish Prime Minister and the Italian Prime Minister and the Australian Prime Minister went to war in 2003 on a potage of lies and mendacity and, given the weapons we used, with great brutality.
In the aftermath of the international crimes against humanity of 2001 we have tortured, we have murdered, we have brutalised and killed the innocent - we have even added our shame at Abu Ghraib to Saddam's shame at Abu Ghraib - and yet we are supposed to forget these terrible crimes as we applaud the swinging corpse of the dictator we created.
Who encouraged Saddam to invade Iran in 1980, which was the greatest war crime he has committed for it led to the deaths of a million and a half souls? And who sold him the components for the chemical weapons with which he drenched Iran and the Kurds? We did. No wonder the Americans, who controlled Saddam's weird trial, forbad any mention of this, his most obscene atrocity, in the charges against him. Could he not have been handed over to the Iranians for sentencing for this massive war crime? Of course not. Because that would also expose our culpability.
And the mass killings we perpetrated in 2003 with our depleted uranium shells and our "bunker buster" bombs and our phosphorous, the murderous post-invasion sieges of Fallujah and Najaf, the hell-disaster of anarchy we unleashed on the Iraqi population in the aftermath of our "victory" - our "mission accomplished" - who will be found guilty of this? Such expiation as we might expect will come, no doubt, in the self-serving memoirs of Blair and Bush, written in comfortable and wealthy retirement.
Hours before Saddam's death sentence, his family - his first wife, Sajida, and Saddam's daughter and their other relatives - had given up hope.
"Whatever could be done has been done - we can only wait for time to take its course," one of them said last night. But Saddam knew, and had already announced his own "martyrdom": he was still the president of Iraq and he would die for Iraq. All condemned men face a decision: to die with a last, grovelling plea for mercy or to die with whatever dignity they can wrap around themselves in their last hours on earth. His last trial appearance - that wan smile that spread over the mass-murderer's face - showed us which path Saddam intended to walk to the noose.
I have catalogued his monstrous crimes over the years. I have talked to the Kurdish survivors of Halabja and the Shia who rose up against the dictator at our request in 1991 and who were betrayed by us - and whose comrades, in their tens of thousands, along with their wives, were hanged like thrushes by Saddam's executioners.
I have walked round the execution chamber of Abu Ghraib - only months, it later transpired, after we had been using the same prison for a few tortures and killings of our own - and I have watched Iraqis pull thousands of their dead relatives from the mass graves of Hilla. One of them has a newly-inserted artificial hip and a medical identification number on his arm. He had been taken directly from hospital to his place of execution. Like Donald Rumsfeld, I have even shaken the dictator's soft, damp hand. Yet the old war criminal finished his days in power writing romantic novels.
It was my colleague, Tom Friedman - now a messianic columnist for The New York Times - who perfectly caught Saddam's character just before the 2003 invasion: Saddam was, he wrote, "part Don Corleone, part Donald Duck". And, in this unique definition, Friedman caught the horror of all dictators; their sadistic attraction and the grotesque, unbelievable nature of their barbarity.
But that is not how the Arab world will see him. At first, those who suffered from Saddam's cruelty will welcome his execution. Hundreds wanted to pull the hangman's lever. So will many other Kurds and Shia outside Iraq welcome his end. But they - and millions of other Muslims - will remember how he was informed of his death sentence at the dawn of the Eid al-Adha feast, which recalls the would-be sacrifice by Abraham, of his son, a commemoration which even the ghastly Saddam cynically used to celebrate by releasing prisoners from his jails. "Handed over to the Iraqi authorities," he may have been before his death. But his execution will go down - correctly - as an American affair and time will add its false but lasting gloss to all this - that the West destroyed an Arab leader who no longer obeyed his orders from Washington, that, for all his wrongdoing (and this will be the terrible get-out for Arab historians, this shaving away of his crimes) Saddam died a "martyr" to the will of the new "Crusaders".
When he was captured in November of 2003, the insurgency against American troops increased in ferocity. After his death, it will redouble in intensity again. Freed from the remotest possibility of Saddam's return by his execution, the West's enemies in Iraq have no reason to fear the return of his Baathist regime. Osama bin Laden will certainly rejoice, along with Bush and Blair. And there's a thought. So many crimes avenged.
But we will have got away with it.
Sonntag, Dezember 31, 2006
Saddam: The death of a dictator
Salon.com
Saddam: The death of a dictator
Through the bumbling of the U.S.-backed regime, justice becomes revenge, and a despot becomes a martyr.
By Juan Cole
Dec. 30, 2006 | The body of Saddam, as it swung from the gallows at 6 a.m. Saturday Baghdad time, cast an ominous shadow over Iraq. The execution provoked intense questions about whether his trial was fair and about what the fallout will be. One thing is certain: The trial and execution of Saddam were about revenge, not justice. Instead of promoting national reconciliation, this act of revenge helped Saddam portray himself one last time as a symbol of Sunni Arab resistance, and became one more incitement to sectarian warfare.
Saddam Hussein was tried under the shadow of a foreign military occupation, by a government full of his personal enemies. The first judge, an ethnic Kurd, resigned because of government interference in the trial; the judge who took his place was also Kurdish and had grievances against the accused. Three of Saddam's defense lawyers were shot down in cold blood. The surviving members of his defense team went on strike to protest the lack of protection afforded them. The court then appointed new lawyers who had no expertise in international law. Most of the witnesses against Saddam gave hearsay evidence. The trial ground slowly but certainly toward the inevitable death verdict.
Like everything else in Iraq since 2003, Saddam's trial became entangled in sectarian politics. Iraq is roughly 60 percent Shiite, 18 percent Sunni Arab and 18 percent Kurdish. Elements of the Sunni minority were favored under fellow Sunni Saddam, and during his long, brutal reign this community tended to have high rates of membership in the Baath Party. Although many members of Saddam's own ethnic group deeply disliked him, since the U.S. invasion he has gradually emerged as a symbol of the humiliation that the once-dominant Sunni minority has suffered under a new government dominated by Shiites and Kurds.
Saddam was a symbol of Sunni-Shiite rivalry long before the U.S. occupation. In 1991, while he was in power, he had ferociously suppressed the post-Gulf War Shiite uprising in the south, using helicopter gunships and tanks to kill an estimated 60,000. After the invasion, many Shiites wanted him to be captured, while many Sunnis helped him elude capture. When Saddam was finally caught by U.S. forces in late 2003, Shiites in the Baghdad district of Kadhimiya crossed the bridge over the Tigris to dance and gloat in the neighboring Sunni Arab district of Adhamiya, provoking some clashes. After his capture, students at Mosul University, in Iraq's second-largest and mostly Sunni Arab city, chanted, "Bush, Bush, hear our refrain: We all love Saddam Hussein!" and "We'll die, we'll die, but the nation will live! And America will fall!"
As the U.S. consolidated control over Iraq, meanwhile, Sunni alienation increased. The American occupiers adopted punitive measures against members of the Baath Party, who were disproportionately though by no means universally Sunni Arab. The army was dissolved, sidelining 400,000 troops and the predominantly Sunni officer corps. Thousands of Sunni Arab civil servants and even schoolteachers were fired.
A "de-Baathification" committee, dominated by hard-line Shiites like Nouri al-Maliki (now prime minister) and Ahmed Chalabi, denied large numbers of Sunni Arabs the right to participate in political society or hold government positions on grounds of links to the Baath Party. Sometimes politicians were blackballed simply because a relative had been high in the party.
As Iraq spiraled down into a brutal civil war with massive killing and ethnic cleansing, many Iraqis began to yearn for the oppressive security of the Saddam period. After the destruction of the golden dome of the Shiite Askariya mosque in Samarra last February, Iraqis fell into an orgy of sectarian reprisal killings.
By the time of Saddam's trial, sectarian strife was widespread, and the trial simply made it worse. It was not just the inherent bias of a judicial system dominated by his political enemies. Even the crimes for which he was tried were a source of ethnic friction. Saddam Hussein had had many Sunni Arabs killed, and a trial on such a charge could have been politically savvy. Instead, he was accused of the execution of scores of Shiites in Dujail in 1982. This Shiite town had been a hotbed of activism by the Shiite fundamentalist Dawa (Islamic Call) Party, which was founded in the late 1950s and modeled on the Communist Party. In the wake of Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini's 1979 Islamic Revolution in neighboring Iran, Saddam conceived a profound fear of Dawa and similar parties, banning them and making membership a capital crime. Young Dawa leaders such as al-Maliki fled to Tehran, Iran, or Damascus, Syria.
When Saddam visited Dujail, Dawa agents attempted to assassinate him. In turn, he wrought a terrible revenge on the town's young men. Current Prime Minister al-Maliki is the leader of the Dawa Party and served for years in exile in its Damascus bureau. For a Dawa-led government to try Saddam, especially for this crackdown on a Dawa stronghold, makes it look to Sunni Arabs more like a sectarian reprisal than a dispassionate trial for crimes against humanity.
Passions did not subside with time. When the death verdict was announced against Saddam in November, Sunni Arabs in Baquba, to the northeast of the capital, staged a big pro-Saddam demonstration. They were attacked by the Shiite police that dominate that mixed city, who killed 20 demonstrators and wounded a similar number. There were also pro-Saddam demonstrations in Fallujah and Mosul. Baghdad had to be put under curfew.
The tribunal also had a unique sense of timing when choosing the day for Saddam's hanging. It was a slap in the face to Sunni Arabs. This weekend marks Eid al-Adha, the Holy Day of Sacrifice, on which Muslims commemorate the willingness of Abraham to sacrifice his son for God. Shiites celebrate it Sunday. Sunnis celebrate it Saturday –- and Iraqi law forbids executing the condemned on a major holiday. Hanging Saddam on Saturday was perceived by Sunni Arabs as the act of a Shiite government that had accepted the Shiite ritual calendar.
The timing also allowed Saddam, in his farewell address to Iraq, to pose as a “sacrifice” for his nation, an explicit reference to Eid al-Adha. The tribunal had given the old secular nationalist the chance to use religious language to play on the sympathies of the whole Iraqi public.
The political ineptitude of the tribunal, from start to finish, was astonishing. The United States and its Iraqi allies basically gave Saddam a platform on which to make himself a martyr to Iraqi unity and independence -- even if by unity and independence Saddam was really appealing to Sunnis' nostalgia for their days of hegemony.
In his farewell address, however, Saddam could not help departing from his national-unity script to take a few last shots at his ethnic rivals. Despite some smarmy language urging Iraqis not to hate the Americans, Saddam denounced the "invaders" and "Persians" who had come into Iraq. The invaders are the American army, and the Persians are code not just for Iranian agents but for Iraqi Shiites, whom many Sunni Arabs view as having Iranian antecedents and as not really Iraqi or Arab. It was such attitudes that led to slaughters like that at Dujail.
In his death, as in his life, Saddam Hussein is managing to divide Iraqis and condemn them to further violence and brutality. But the Americans and the Shiite- and Kurd-dominated government bear some blame for the way they botched his trial and gave him this last opportunity to play the spoiler.
Iraq is on high alert, in expectation of protests and guerrilla reprisals. Leaves have been canceled for Iraqi soldiers, though in the past they have seldom paid much attention to such orders. But perhaps the death of Saddam, who once haunted the nightmares of a nation, will soon come to seem insignificant. In Iraq, guerrilla and criminal violence executes as many as 500 persons a day. Saddam's hanging is just one more occasion for a blood feud in a country that now has thousands of them.
-- By Juan Cole
Saddam: The death of a dictator
Through the bumbling of the U.S.-backed regime, justice becomes revenge, and a despot becomes a martyr.
By Juan Cole
Dec. 30, 2006 | The body of Saddam, as it swung from the gallows at 6 a.m. Saturday Baghdad time, cast an ominous shadow over Iraq. The execution provoked intense questions about whether his trial was fair and about what the fallout will be. One thing is certain: The trial and execution of Saddam were about revenge, not justice. Instead of promoting national reconciliation, this act of revenge helped Saddam portray himself one last time as a symbol of Sunni Arab resistance, and became one more incitement to sectarian warfare.
Saddam Hussein was tried under the shadow of a foreign military occupation, by a government full of his personal enemies. The first judge, an ethnic Kurd, resigned because of government interference in the trial; the judge who took his place was also Kurdish and had grievances against the accused. Three of Saddam's defense lawyers were shot down in cold blood. The surviving members of his defense team went on strike to protest the lack of protection afforded them. The court then appointed new lawyers who had no expertise in international law. Most of the witnesses against Saddam gave hearsay evidence. The trial ground slowly but certainly toward the inevitable death verdict.
Like everything else in Iraq since 2003, Saddam's trial became entangled in sectarian politics. Iraq is roughly 60 percent Shiite, 18 percent Sunni Arab and 18 percent Kurdish. Elements of the Sunni minority were favored under fellow Sunni Saddam, and during his long, brutal reign this community tended to have high rates of membership in the Baath Party. Although many members of Saddam's own ethnic group deeply disliked him, since the U.S. invasion he has gradually emerged as a symbol of the humiliation that the once-dominant Sunni minority has suffered under a new government dominated by Shiites and Kurds.
Saddam was a symbol of Sunni-Shiite rivalry long before the U.S. occupation. In 1991, while he was in power, he had ferociously suppressed the post-Gulf War Shiite uprising in the south, using helicopter gunships and tanks to kill an estimated 60,000. After the invasion, many Shiites wanted him to be captured, while many Sunnis helped him elude capture. When Saddam was finally caught by U.S. forces in late 2003, Shiites in the Baghdad district of Kadhimiya crossed the bridge over the Tigris to dance and gloat in the neighboring Sunni Arab district of Adhamiya, provoking some clashes. After his capture, students at Mosul University, in Iraq's second-largest and mostly Sunni Arab city, chanted, "Bush, Bush, hear our refrain: We all love Saddam Hussein!" and "We'll die, we'll die, but the nation will live! And America will fall!"
As the U.S. consolidated control over Iraq, meanwhile, Sunni alienation increased. The American occupiers adopted punitive measures against members of the Baath Party, who were disproportionately though by no means universally Sunni Arab. The army was dissolved, sidelining 400,000 troops and the predominantly Sunni officer corps. Thousands of Sunni Arab civil servants and even schoolteachers were fired.
A "de-Baathification" committee, dominated by hard-line Shiites like Nouri al-Maliki (now prime minister) and Ahmed Chalabi, denied large numbers of Sunni Arabs the right to participate in political society or hold government positions on grounds of links to the Baath Party. Sometimes politicians were blackballed simply because a relative had been high in the party.
As Iraq spiraled down into a brutal civil war with massive killing and ethnic cleansing, many Iraqis began to yearn for the oppressive security of the Saddam period. After the destruction of the golden dome of the Shiite Askariya mosque in Samarra last February, Iraqis fell into an orgy of sectarian reprisal killings.
By the time of Saddam's trial, sectarian strife was widespread, and the trial simply made it worse. It was not just the inherent bias of a judicial system dominated by his political enemies. Even the crimes for which he was tried were a source of ethnic friction. Saddam Hussein had had many Sunni Arabs killed, and a trial on such a charge could have been politically savvy. Instead, he was accused of the execution of scores of Shiites in Dujail in 1982. This Shiite town had been a hotbed of activism by the Shiite fundamentalist Dawa (Islamic Call) Party, which was founded in the late 1950s and modeled on the Communist Party. In the wake of Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini's 1979 Islamic Revolution in neighboring Iran, Saddam conceived a profound fear of Dawa and similar parties, banning them and making membership a capital crime. Young Dawa leaders such as al-Maliki fled to Tehran, Iran, or Damascus, Syria.
When Saddam visited Dujail, Dawa agents attempted to assassinate him. In turn, he wrought a terrible revenge on the town's young men. Current Prime Minister al-Maliki is the leader of the Dawa Party and served for years in exile in its Damascus bureau. For a Dawa-led government to try Saddam, especially for this crackdown on a Dawa stronghold, makes it look to Sunni Arabs more like a sectarian reprisal than a dispassionate trial for crimes against humanity.
Passions did not subside with time. When the death verdict was announced against Saddam in November, Sunni Arabs in Baquba, to the northeast of the capital, staged a big pro-Saddam demonstration. They were attacked by the Shiite police that dominate that mixed city, who killed 20 demonstrators and wounded a similar number. There were also pro-Saddam demonstrations in Fallujah and Mosul. Baghdad had to be put under curfew.
The tribunal also had a unique sense of timing when choosing the day for Saddam's hanging. It was a slap in the face to Sunni Arabs. This weekend marks Eid al-Adha, the Holy Day of Sacrifice, on which Muslims commemorate the willingness of Abraham to sacrifice his son for God. Shiites celebrate it Sunday. Sunnis celebrate it Saturday –- and Iraqi law forbids executing the condemned on a major holiday. Hanging Saddam on Saturday was perceived by Sunni Arabs as the act of a Shiite government that had accepted the Shiite ritual calendar.
The timing also allowed Saddam, in his farewell address to Iraq, to pose as a “sacrifice” for his nation, an explicit reference to Eid al-Adha. The tribunal had given the old secular nationalist the chance to use religious language to play on the sympathies of the whole Iraqi public.
The political ineptitude of the tribunal, from start to finish, was astonishing. The United States and its Iraqi allies basically gave Saddam a platform on which to make himself a martyr to Iraqi unity and independence -- even if by unity and independence Saddam was really appealing to Sunnis' nostalgia for their days of hegemony.
In his farewell address, however, Saddam could not help departing from his national-unity script to take a few last shots at his ethnic rivals. Despite some smarmy language urging Iraqis not to hate the Americans, Saddam denounced the "invaders" and "Persians" who had come into Iraq. The invaders are the American army, and the Persians are code not just for Iranian agents but for Iraqi Shiites, whom many Sunni Arabs view as having Iranian antecedents and as not really Iraqi or Arab. It was such attitudes that led to slaughters like that at Dujail.
In his death, as in his life, Saddam Hussein is managing to divide Iraqis and condemn them to further violence and brutality. But the Americans and the Shiite- and Kurd-dominated government bear some blame for the way they botched his trial and gave him this last opportunity to play the spoiler.
Iraq is on high alert, in expectation of protests and guerrilla reprisals. Leaves have been canceled for Iraqi soldiers, though in the past they have seldom paid much attention to such orders. But perhaps the death of Saddam, who once haunted the nightmares of a nation, will soon come to seem insignificant. In Iraq, guerrilla and criminal violence executes as many as 500 persons a day. Saddam's hanging is just one more occasion for a blood feud in a country that now has thousands of them.
-- By Juan Cole
Samstag, Dezember 30, 2006
Iran: CIA censored OP-ED piece for the New York Times
December 22, 2006
NEW York TIMES
Op-Ed Contributors
What We Wanted to Tell You About Iran
By FLYNT LEVERETT and HILLARY MANN
Washington
Below (click on "Read more") is the redacted version of a draft Op-Ed article we wrote for The Times, as blacked out by the Central Intelligence Agency’s Publication Review Board after the White House intervened in the normal prepublication review process and demanded substantial deletions. Agency officials told us that they had concluded on their own that the original draft included no classified material, but that they had to bow to the White House.
Indeed, the deleted portions of the original draft reveal no classified material. These passages go into aspects of American-Iranian relations during the Bush administration’s first term that have been publicly discussed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice; former Secretary of State Colin Powell; former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage; a former State Department policy planning director, Richard Haass; and a former special envoy to Afghanistan, James Dobbins.
These aspects have been extensively reported in the news media, and one of us, Mr. Leverett, has written about them in The Times and other publications with the explicit permission of the review board. We provided the following citations to the board to demonstrate that all of the material the White House objected to is already in the public domain. Unfortunately, to make sense of much of our Op-Ed article, readers will have to read the citations for themselves. (See this link for example pdf)
The decisions of the C.I.A. and the White House took us by surprise. Since leaving government service three and a half years ago, Mr. Leverett has put more than 20 articles through the C.I.A.’s prepublication review process and the Publication Review Board has never changed a word or asked the White House for permission to clear these articles.
What’s more, we have spent a collective 20 years serving our country as career civil servants in national security, for both Republican and Democratic administrations. We know firsthand the importance of protecting sensitive information. But we also know the importance of shared knowledge. In the entrance to the C.I.A.’s headquarters the words of the Gospel of John are inscribed, “And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free.”
National security must be above politics. In a democracy, transparency in government has to be honored and protected. To classify information for reasons other than the safety and security of the United States and its interests is a violation of these principles. It is for this reason that we will continue to press for the release of the article without the material deleted.
To read the redacted version by clicking on "Read more"
December 22, 2006
NEW YORK TIMES
Link to the NYT version
Op-Ed Contributors
Redacted Version of Original Op-Ed
By FLYNT LEVERETT and HILLARY MANN
The Iraq Study Group has added its voice to a burgeoning chorus of commentators, politicians, and former officials calling for a limited, tactical dialogue with Iran regarding Iraq. The Bush administration has indicated a conditional willingness to pursue a similarly compartmented dialogue with Tehran over Iran’s nuclear activities.
Unfortunately, advocates of limited engagement — either for short-term gains on specific issues or to “test” Iran regarding broader rapprochement — do not seem to understand the 20-year history of United States-Iranian cooperation on discrete issues or appreciate the impact of that history on Iran’s strategic outlook. In the current regional context, issue-specific engagement with Iran is bound to fail. The only diplomatic approach that might succeed is a comprehensive one aimed at a “grand bargain” between the United States and the Islamic Republic.
Since the 1980s, cooperation with Iran on specific issues has been tried by successive administrations, but United States policymakers have consistently allowed domestic politics or other foreign policy interests to torpedo such cooperation and any chance for a broader opening. The Reagan administration’s engagement with Iran to secure the release of American hostages in Lebanon came to grief in the Iran-contra scandal. The first Bush administration resumed contacts with Tehran to secure release of the last American hostages in Lebanon, but postponed pursuit of broader rapprochement until after the 1992 presidential election.
In 1994, the Clinton administration acquiesced to the shipment of Iranian arms to Bosnian Muslims, but the leak of this activity in 1996 and criticism from presumptive Republican presidential nominee Robert Dole shut down possibilities for further United States-Iranian cooperation for several years.
These episodes reinforced already considerable suspicion among Iranian leaders about United States intentions toward the Islamic Republic. But, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, senior Iranian diplomats told us that Tehran believed it had a historic opportunity to improve relations with Washington. Iranian leaders offered to help the United States in responding to the attacks without making that help contingent on changes in America’s Iran policy — a condition stipulated in the late 1990s when Tehran rejected the Clinton administration’s offer of dialogue — calculating that cooperation would ultimately prompt fundamental shifts in United States policy.
The argument that Iran helped America in Afghanistan because it was in Tehran’s interest to get rid of the Taliban is misplaced. Iran could have let America remove the Taliban without getting its own hands dirty, as it remained neutral during the 1991 gulf war. Tehran cooperated with United States efforts in Afghanistan primarily because it wanted a better relationship with Washington.
But Tehran was profoundly disappointed with the United States response. After the 9/11 attacks, xxx xxx xx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxxx xx set the stage for a November 2001 meeting between Secretary of State Colin Powell and the foreign ministers of Afghanistan’s six neighbors and Russia. xxxx xxxxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxx xxxx xx xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxx xxx xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxx xxxxx xxxxx xx xxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxx xxxxx Iran went along, working with the United States to eliminate the Taliban and establish a post-Taliban political order in Afghanistan.
In December 2001, xxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx x Tehran to keep Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the brutal pro-Al Qaeda warlord, from returning to Afghanistan to lead jihadist resistance there. xxxxx xxxxxxx so long as the Bush administration did not criticize it for harboring terrorists. But, in his January 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush did just that in labeling Iran part of the “axis of evil.” Unsurprisingly, Mr. Hekmatyar managed to leave Iran in short order after the speech. xxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxx the Islamic Republic could not be seen to be harboring terrorists.
xxx xxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxx xxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxx xxx xxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxx xxxxxxxx xxxx xxxxxxxx xxxx xx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxx xxxxx xxxx xxxxx xxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxxx xx xxxxx xxx xx xxxxxxx This demonstrated to Afghan warlords that they could not play America and Iran off one another and prompted Tehran to deport hundreds of suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives who had fled Afghanistan.
Those who argue that Iran did not cause Iraq’s problems and therefore can be of only limited help in dealing with Iraq’s current instability must also acknowledge that Iran did not “cause” Afghanistan’s deterioration into a terrorist-harboring failed state. But, when America and Iran worked together, Afghanistan was much more stable than it is today, Al Qaeda was on the run, the Islamic Republic’s Hezbollah protégé was comparatively restrained, and Tehran was not spinning centrifuges. Still, the Bush administration conveyed no interest in building on these positive trends.
xxx xxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxx xxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx x xxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxx xx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxx x xx x x xxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xx xxxx xxxxx xxxxx xx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxx xxxx xxx xxxxxxx xxxxx xx xxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxx xxxx xxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxx xxxxxxxx xx
From an Iranian perspective, this record shows that Washington will take what it can get from talking to Iran on specific issues but is not prepared for real rapprochement. Yet American proponents of limited engagement anticipate that Tehran will play this fruitless game once more — even after numerous statements by senior administration figures targeting the Islamic Republic for prospective “regime change” and by President Bush himself that attacking Iran’s nuclear and national security infrastructure is “on the table.”
Our experience dealing with xxxx xxxx Iranian diplomats over Afghanistan and in more recent private conversations in Europe and elsewhere convince us that Iran will not go down such a dead-end road again. Iran will not help the United States in Iraq because it wants to avoid chaos there; Tehran is well positioned to defend its interests in Iraq unilaterally as America flounders. Similarly, Iran will not accept strategically meaningful limits on its nuclear capabilities for a package of economic and technological goodies.
Iran will only cooperate with the United States, whether in Iraq or on the nuclear issue, as part of a broader rapprochement addressing its core security concerns. This requires extension of a United States security guarantee — effectively, an American commitment not to use force to change the borders or form of government of the Islamic Republic — bolstered by the prospect of lifting United States unilateral sanctions and normalizing bilateral relations. This is something no United States administration has ever offered, and that the Bush administration has explicitly refused to consider.
Indeed, no administration would be able to provide a security guarantee unless United States concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities, regional role and support for terrorist organizations were definitively addressed. That is why, at this juncture, resolving any of the significant bilateral differences between the United States and Iran inevitably requires resolving all of them. Implementing the reciprocal commitments entailed in a “grand bargain” would almost certainly play out over time and in phases, but all of the commitments would be agreed up front as a package, so that both sides would know what they were getting.
Unfortunately, the window for pursuing a comprehensive settlement with Iran will not be open indefinitely. The Iranian leadership is more radicalized today, with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president, than it was three years ago, and could become more radicalized in the future, depending on who ultimately succeeds Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as supreme leader. If President Bush does not move decisively toward strategic engagement with Tehran during his remaining two years in office, his successor will not have the same opportunities that he will have so blithely squandered.
NEW York TIMES
Op-Ed Contributors
What We Wanted to Tell You About Iran
By FLYNT LEVERETT and HILLARY MANN
Washington
Below (click on "Read more") is the redacted version of a draft Op-Ed article we wrote for The Times, as blacked out by the Central Intelligence Agency’s Publication Review Board after the White House intervened in the normal prepublication review process and demanded substantial deletions. Agency officials told us that they had concluded on their own that the original draft included no classified material, but that they had to bow to the White House.
Indeed, the deleted portions of the original draft reveal no classified material. These passages go into aspects of American-Iranian relations during the Bush administration’s first term that have been publicly discussed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice; former Secretary of State Colin Powell; former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage; a former State Department policy planning director, Richard Haass; and a former special envoy to Afghanistan, James Dobbins.
These aspects have been extensively reported in the news media, and one of us, Mr. Leverett, has written about them in The Times and other publications with the explicit permission of the review board. We provided the following citations to the board to demonstrate that all of the material the White House objected to is already in the public domain. Unfortunately, to make sense of much of our Op-Ed article, readers will have to read the citations for themselves. (See this link for example pdf)
The decisions of the C.I.A. and the White House took us by surprise. Since leaving government service three and a half years ago, Mr. Leverett has put more than 20 articles through the C.I.A.’s prepublication review process and the Publication Review Board has never changed a word or asked the White House for permission to clear these articles.
What’s more, we have spent a collective 20 years serving our country as career civil servants in national security, for both Republican and Democratic administrations. We know firsthand the importance of protecting sensitive information. But we also know the importance of shared knowledge. In the entrance to the C.I.A.’s headquarters the words of the Gospel of John are inscribed, “And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free.”
National security must be above politics. In a democracy, transparency in government has to be honored and protected. To classify information for reasons other than the safety and security of the United States and its interests is a violation of these principles. It is for this reason that we will continue to press for the release of the article without the material deleted.
To read the redacted version by clicking on "Read more"
December 22, 2006
NEW YORK TIMES
Link to the NYT version
Op-Ed Contributors
Redacted Version of Original Op-Ed
By FLYNT LEVERETT and HILLARY MANN
The Iraq Study Group has added its voice to a burgeoning chorus of commentators, politicians, and former officials calling for a limited, tactical dialogue with Iran regarding Iraq. The Bush administration has indicated a conditional willingness to pursue a similarly compartmented dialogue with Tehran over Iran’s nuclear activities.
Unfortunately, advocates of limited engagement — either for short-term gains on specific issues or to “test” Iran regarding broader rapprochement — do not seem to understand the 20-year history of United States-Iranian cooperation on discrete issues or appreciate the impact of that history on Iran’s strategic outlook. In the current regional context, issue-specific engagement with Iran is bound to fail. The only diplomatic approach that might succeed is a comprehensive one aimed at a “grand bargain” between the United States and the Islamic Republic.
Since the 1980s, cooperation with Iran on specific issues has been tried by successive administrations, but United States policymakers have consistently allowed domestic politics or other foreign policy interests to torpedo such cooperation and any chance for a broader opening. The Reagan administration’s engagement with Iran to secure the release of American hostages in Lebanon came to grief in the Iran-contra scandal. The first Bush administration resumed contacts with Tehran to secure release of the last American hostages in Lebanon, but postponed pursuit of broader rapprochement until after the 1992 presidential election.
In 1994, the Clinton administration acquiesced to the shipment of Iranian arms to Bosnian Muslims, but the leak of this activity in 1996 and criticism from presumptive Republican presidential nominee Robert Dole shut down possibilities for further United States-Iranian cooperation for several years.
These episodes reinforced already considerable suspicion among Iranian leaders about United States intentions toward the Islamic Republic. But, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, senior Iranian diplomats told us that Tehran believed it had a historic opportunity to improve relations with Washington. Iranian leaders offered to help the United States in responding to the attacks without making that help contingent on changes in America’s Iran policy — a condition stipulated in the late 1990s when Tehran rejected the Clinton administration’s offer of dialogue — calculating that cooperation would ultimately prompt fundamental shifts in United States policy.
The argument that Iran helped America in Afghanistan because it was in Tehran’s interest to get rid of the Taliban is misplaced. Iran could have let America remove the Taliban without getting its own hands dirty, as it remained neutral during the 1991 gulf war. Tehran cooperated with United States efforts in Afghanistan primarily because it wanted a better relationship with Washington.
But Tehran was profoundly disappointed with the United States response. After the 9/11 attacks, xxx xxx xx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxxx xx set the stage for a November 2001 meeting between Secretary of State Colin Powell and the foreign ministers of Afghanistan’s six neighbors and Russia. xxxx xxxxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxx xxxx xx xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxx xxx xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxx xxxxx xxxxx xx xxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxx xxxxx Iran went along, working with the United States to eliminate the Taliban and establish a post-Taliban political order in Afghanistan.
In December 2001, xxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx x Tehran to keep Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the brutal pro-Al Qaeda warlord, from returning to Afghanistan to lead jihadist resistance there. xxxxx xxxxxxx so long as the Bush administration did not criticize it for harboring terrorists. But, in his January 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush did just that in labeling Iran part of the “axis of evil.” Unsurprisingly, Mr. Hekmatyar managed to leave Iran in short order after the speech. xxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxx the Islamic Republic could not be seen to be harboring terrorists.
xxx xxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxx xxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxx xxx xxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxx xxxxxxxx xxxx xxxxxxxx xxxx xx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxx xxxxx xxxx xxxxx xxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxxx xx xxxxx xxx xx xxxxxxx This demonstrated to Afghan warlords that they could not play America and Iran off one another and prompted Tehran to deport hundreds of suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives who had fled Afghanistan.
Those who argue that Iran did not cause Iraq’s problems and therefore can be of only limited help in dealing with Iraq’s current instability must also acknowledge that Iran did not “cause” Afghanistan’s deterioration into a terrorist-harboring failed state. But, when America and Iran worked together, Afghanistan was much more stable than it is today, Al Qaeda was on the run, the Islamic Republic’s Hezbollah protégé was comparatively restrained, and Tehran was not spinning centrifuges. Still, the Bush administration conveyed no interest in building on these positive trends.
xxx xxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxx xxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx x xxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxx xx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxx x xx x x xxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xx xxxx xxxxx xxxxx xx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxx xxxx xxx xxxxxxx xxxxx xx xxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxx xxxx xxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxx xxxxxxxx xx
From an Iranian perspective, this record shows that Washington will take what it can get from talking to Iran on specific issues but is not prepared for real rapprochement. Yet American proponents of limited engagement anticipate that Tehran will play this fruitless game once more — even after numerous statements by senior administration figures targeting the Islamic Republic for prospective “regime change” and by President Bush himself that attacking Iran’s nuclear and national security infrastructure is “on the table.”
Our experience dealing with xxxx xxxx Iranian diplomats over Afghanistan and in more recent private conversations in Europe and elsewhere convince us that Iran will not go down such a dead-end road again. Iran will not help the United States in Iraq because it wants to avoid chaos there; Tehran is well positioned to defend its interests in Iraq unilaterally as America flounders. Similarly, Iran will not accept strategically meaningful limits on its nuclear capabilities for a package of economic and technological goodies.
Iran will only cooperate with the United States, whether in Iraq or on the nuclear issue, as part of a broader rapprochement addressing its core security concerns. This requires extension of a United States security guarantee — effectively, an American commitment not to use force to change the borders or form of government of the Islamic Republic — bolstered by the prospect of lifting United States unilateral sanctions and normalizing bilateral relations. This is something no United States administration has ever offered, and that the Bush administration has explicitly refused to consider.
Indeed, no administration would be able to provide a security guarantee unless United States concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities, regional role and support for terrorist organizations were definitively addressed. That is why, at this juncture, resolving any of the significant bilateral differences between the United States and Iran inevitably requires resolving all of them. Implementing the reciprocal commitments entailed in a “grand bargain” would almost certainly play out over time and in phases, but all of the commitments would be agreed up front as a package, so that both sides would know what they were getting.
Unfortunately, the window for pursuing a comprehensive settlement with Iran will not be open indefinitely. The Iranian leadership is more radicalized today, with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president, than it was three years ago, and could become more radicalized in the future, depending on who ultimately succeeds Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as supreme leader. If President Bush does not move decisively toward strategic engagement with Tehran during his remaining two years in office, his successor will not have the same opportunities that he will have so blithely squandered.
New year special: Stay the course!
click on pic to enlarge
Yep, focus on your strengths and STAY THE COURSE, really .....
Yep, focus on your strengths and STAY THE COURSE, really .....
Freitag, Dezember 29, 2006
Donnerstag, Dezember 28, 2006
Top Ten Myths about Iraq 2006
Prof. Juan Cole spells it out.
Juan Cole on Wikipedia
Top Ten Myths about Iraq 2006
By Juan Cole
12/26/06 "Information Clearing House" -- --- 1. Myth number one is that the United States "can still win" in Iraq. Of course, the truth of this statement, frequently still made by William Kristol and other Neoconservatives, depends on what "winning" means. But if it means the establishment of a stable, pro-American, anti-Iranian government with an effective and even-handed army and police force in the near or even medium term, then the assertion is frankly ridiculous. The Iraqi "government" is barely functioning. The parliament was not able to meet in December because it could not attain a quorum. Many key Iraqi politicians live most of the time in London, and much of parliament is frequently abroad. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki does not control large swathes of the country, and could give few orders that had any chance of being obeyed. The US military cannot shore up this government, even with an extra division, because the government is divided against itself. Most of the major parties trying to craft legislation are also linked to militias on the streets who are killing one another. It is over with. Iraq is in for years of heavy political violence of a sort that no foreign military force can hope to stop.
The United States cannot "win" in the sense defined above. It cannot. And the blindly arrogant assumption that it can win is calculated to get more tens of thousands of Iraqis killed and more thousands of American soldiers and Marines badly wounded or killed. Moreover, since Iraq is coming apart at the seams under the impact of our presence there, there is a real danger that we will radically destabilize it and the whole oil-producing Gulf if we try to stay longer.
2. "US military sweeps of neighborhoods can drive the guerrillas out." The US put an extra 15,000 men into Baghdad this past summer, aiming to crush the guerrillas and stop the violence in the capital, and the number of attacks actually increased. This result comes about in part because the guerrillas are not outsiders who come in and then are forced out. The Sunni Arabs of Ghazaliya and Dora districts in the capital are the "insurgents." The US military cannot defeat the Sunni Arab guerrilla movement or "insurgency" with less than 500,000 troops, based on what we have seen in the Balkans and other such conflict situations. The US destroyed Falluja, and even it and other cities of al-Anbar province are not now safe! The US military leaders on the ground have spoken of the desirability of just withdrawing from al-Anbar to Baghdad and giving up on it. In 2003, 14 percent of Sunni Arabs thought it legitimate to attack US personnel and facilities. In August, 2006, over 70 percent did. How long before it is 100%? Winning guerrilla wars requires two victories, a military victory over the guerrillas and a winning of the hearts and minds of the general public, thus denying the guerrillas support. The US has not and is unlikely to be able to repress the guerrillas, and it is losing hearts and minds at an increasing and alarming rate. They hate us, folks. They don't want us there.
3. The United States is best off throwing all its support behind the Iraqi Shiites. This is the position adopted fairly consistently by Marc Reuel Gerecht. Gerecht is an informed and acute observer whose views I respect even when I disagree with them. But Washington policy-makers should read Daniel Goleman's work on social intelligence. Goleman points out that a good manager of a team in a corporation sets up a win/win framework for every member of the team. If you set it up on a win/lose basis, so that some are actively punished and others "triumph," you are asking for trouble. Conflict is natural. How you manage conflict is what matters. If you listen to employees' grievances and try to figure out how they can be resolved in such a way that everyone benefits, then you are a good manager.
Gerecht, it seems to me, sets up a win/lose model in Iraq. The Shiites and Kurds win it all, and the Sunni Arabs get screwed over. Practically speaking, the Bush policy has been Gerechtian, which in my view has caused all the problems. We shouldn't have thought of our goal as installing the Shiites in power. Of course, Bush hoped that those so installed would be "secular," and that is what Wolfowitz and Chalabi had promised him. Gerecht came up with the ex post facto justification that even the religious Shiites are moving toward democracy via Sistani. But democracy cannot be about one sectarian identity prevailing over, and marginalizing others.
The Sunni Arabs have demonstrated conclusively that they can act effectively as spoilers in the new Iraq. If they aren't happy, no one is going to be. The US must negotiate with the guerrilla leaders and find a win/win framework for them to come in from the cold and work alongside the Kurds and the religious Shiites. About this, US Ambassador in Baghdad Zalmay Khalilzad has been absolutely right.
4. "Iraq is not in a civil war," as Jurassic conservative Fox commentator Bill O'Reilly insists. There is a well-established social science definition of civil war put forward by Professor J. David Singer and his colleagues: "Sustained military combat, primarily internal, resulting in at least 1,000 battle-deaths per year, pitting central government forces against an insurgent force capable of effective resistance, determined by the latter's ability to inflict upon the government forces at least 5 percent of the fatalities that the insurgents sustain." (Errol A. Henderson and J. David Singer, "Civil War in the Post-Colonial World, 1946-92," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 3, May 2000.)" See my article on this in Salon.com. By Singer's definition, Iraq has been in civil war since the Iraqi government was reestablished in summer of 2004. When I have been around political scientists, as at the ISA conference, I have found that scholars in that field tend to accept Singer's definition.
5. "The second Lancet study showing 600,000 excess deaths from political and criminal violence since the US invasion is somehow flawed." Les Roberts replies here to many of the objections that were raised. See also the transcript of the Kucinich-Paul Congressional hearings on the subject. Many critics refer to the numbers of dead reported in the press as counter-arguments to Roberts et al. But "passive reporting" such as news articles never captures more than a fraction of the casualties in any war. I see deaths reported in the Arabic press all the time that never show up in the English language wire services. And, a lot of towns in Iraq don't have local newspapers and many local deaths are not reported in the national newspapers.
6. "Most deaths in Iraq are from bombings." The Lancet study found that the majority of violent deaths are from being shot.
7. "Baghdad and environs are especially violent but the death rate is lower in the rest of the country." The Lancet survey found that levels of violence in the rest of the country are similar to that in Baghdad (remember that the authors included criminal activities such as gang and smuggler turf wars in their statistics). The Shiite south is spared much Sunni-Shiite communal fighting, but criminal gangs, tribal feuds, and militias fight one another over oil and antiquities smuggling, and a lot of people are getting shot down there, too.
8. "Iraq is the central front in the war on terror." From the beginning of history until 2003 there had never been a suicide bombing in Iraq. There was no al-Qaeda in Baath-ruled Iraq. When Baath intelligence heard that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi might have entered Iraq, they grew alarmed at such an "al-Qaeda" presence and put out an APB on him! Zarqawi's so-called "al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia" was never "central" in Iraq and was never responsible for more than a fraction of the violent attacks. This assertion is supported by the outcome of a US-Jordanian operation that killed Zarqawi this year. His death had no impact whatsoever on the level of violence. There are probably only about 1,000 foreign fighters even in Iraq, and most of them are first-time volunteers, not old-time terrorists. The 50 major guerrilla cells in Sunni Arab Iraq are mostly made up of Iraqis, and are mainly: 1) Baathist or neo-Baathist, 2) Sunni revivalist or Salafi, 3) tribally-based, or 4) based in city quarters. Al-Qaeda is mainly a boogey man, invoked in Iraq on all sides, but possessing little real power or presence there. This is not to deny that radical Sunni Arab volunteers come to Iraq to blow things (and often themselves) up. They just are not more than an auxiliary to the big movements, which are Iraqi.
9. "The Sunni Arab guerrillas in places like Ramadi will follow the US home to the American mainland and commit terrorism if we leave Iraq." This assertion is just a variation on the invalid domino theory. People in Ramadi only have one beef with the United States. Its troops are going through their wives' underwear in the course of house searches every day. They don't want the US troops in their town or their homes, dictating to them that they must live under a government of Shiite clerics and Kurdish warlords (as they think of them). If the US withdrew and let the Iraqis work out a way to live with one another, people in Ramadi will be happy. They are not going to start taking flight lessons and trying to get visas to the US. This argument about following us, if it were true, would have prevented us from ever withdrawing from anyplace once we entered a war there. We'd be forever stuck in the Philippines for fear that Filipino terrorists would follow us back home. Or Korea (we moved 15,000 US troops out of South Korea not so long ago. Was that unwise? Are the thereby liberated Koreans now gunning for us?) Or how about the Dominican Republic? Haiti? Grenada? France? The argument is a crock.
10. "Setting a timetable for withdrawal from Iraq is a bad idea." Bush and others in his administration have argued that setting such a timetable would give a significant military advantage to the guerrillas fighting US forces and opposed to the new government. That assertion makes sense only if there were a prospect that the US could militarily crush the Sunni Arabs. There is no such prospect. The guerrilla war is hotter now than at any time since the US invasion. It is more widely supported by more Sunni Arabs than ever before. It is producing more violent attacks than ever before. Since we cannot defeat them short of genocide, we have to negotiate with them. And their first and most urgent demand is that the US set a timetable for withdrawal before they will consider coming into the new political system. That is, we should set a timetable in order to turn the Sunni guerrillas from combatants to a political negotiating partner. Even Sunni politicians cooperating with the US make this demand. They are disappointed with the lack of movement on the issue. How long do they remain willing to cooperate? In addition, 131 Iraqi members of parliament signed a demand that the US set a timetable for withdrawal. (138 would be a simple majority.) It is a a major demand of the Sadr Movement. In fact, the 32 Sadrist MPs withdrew from the ruling United Iraqi Alliance coalition temporarily over this issue.
In my view, Shiite leaders such as Abdul Aziz al-Hakim are repeatedly declining to negotiate in good faith with the Sunni Arabs or to take their views seriously. Al-Hakim knows that if the Sunnis give him any trouble, he can sic the Marines on them. The US presence is making it harder for Iraqi to compromise with Iraqi, which is counterproductive.
Think Progress points out that in 1999, Governor George W. Bush criticized then President Clinton for declining to set a withdrawal timetable for Kosovo, saying "Victory means exit strategy, and it’s important for the president to explain to us what the exit strategy is."
Juan Cole is President of the Global Americana Institute - Visit his website www.juancole.com
Juan Cole on Wikipedia
Top Ten Myths about Iraq 2006
By Juan Cole
12/26/06 "Information Clearing House" -- --- 1. Myth number one is that the United States "can still win" in Iraq. Of course, the truth of this statement, frequently still made by William Kristol and other Neoconservatives, depends on what "winning" means. But if it means the establishment of a stable, pro-American, anti-Iranian government with an effective and even-handed army and police force in the near or even medium term, then the assertion is frankly ridiculous. The Iraqi "government" is barely functioning. The parliament was not able to meet in December because it could not attain a quorum. Many key Iraqi politicians live most of the time in London, and much of parliament is frequently abroad. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki does not control large swathes of the country, and could give few orders that had any chance of being obeyed. The US military cannot shore up this government, even with an extra division, because the government is divided against itself. Most of the major parties trying to craft legislation are also linked to militias on the streets who are killing one another. It is over with. Iraq is in for years of heavy political violence of a sort that no foreign military force can hope to stop.
The United States cannot "win" in the sense defined above. It cannot. And the blindly arrogant assumption that it can win is calculated to get more tens of thousands of Iraqis killed and more thousands of American soldiers and Marines badly wounded or killed. Moreover, since Iraq is coming apart at the seams under the impact of our presence there, there is a real danger that we will radically destabilize it and the whole oil-producing Gulf if we try to stay longer.
2. "US military sweeps of neighborhoods can drive the guerrillas out." The US put an extra 15,000 men into Baghdad this past summer, aiming to crush the guerrillas and stop the violence in the capital, and the number of attacks actually increased. This result comes about in part because the guerrillas are not outsiders who come in and then are forced out. The Sunni Arabs of Ghazaliya and Dora districts in the capital are the "insurgents." The US military cannot defeat the Sunni Arab guerrilla movement or "insurgency" with less than 500,000 troops, based on what we have seen in the Balkans and other such conflict situations. The US destroyed Falluja, and even it and other cities of al-Anbar province are not now safe! The US military leaders on the ground have spoken of the desirability of just withdrawing from al-Anbar to Baghdad and giving up on it. In 2003, 14 percent of Sunni Arabs thought it legitimate to attack US personnel and facilities. In August, 2006, over 70 percent did. How long before it is 100%? Winning guerrilla wars requires two victories, a military victory over the guerrillas and a winning of the hearts and minds of the general public, thus denying the guerrillas support. The US has not and is unlikely to be able to repress the guerrillas, and it is losing hearts and minds at an increasing and alarming rate. They hate us, folks. They don't want us there.
3. The United States is best off throwing all its support behind the Iraqi Shiites. This is the position adopted fairly consistently by Marc Reuel Gerecht. Gerecht is an informed and acute observer whose views I respect even when I disagree with them. But Washington policy-makers should read Daniel Goleman's work on social intelligence. Goleman points out that a good manager of a team in a corporation sets up a win/win framework for every member of the team. If you set it up on a win/lose basis, so that some are actively punished and others "triumph," you are asking for trouble. Conflict is natural. How you manage conflict is what matters. If you listen to employees' grievances and try to figure out how they can be resolved in such a way that everyone benefits, then you are a good manager.
Gerecht, it seems to me, sets up a win/lose model in Iraq. The Shiites and Kurds win it all, and the Sunni Arabs get screwed over. Practically speaking, the Bush policy has been Gerechtian, which in my view has caused all the problems. We shouldn't have thought of our goal as installing the Shiites in power. Of course, Bush hoped that those so installed would be "secular," and that is what Wolfowitz and Chalabi had promised him. Gerecht came up with the ex post facto justification that even the religious Shiites are moving toward democracy via Sistani. But democracy cannot be about one sectarian identity prevailing over, and marginalizing others.
The Sunni Arabs have demonstrated conclusively that they can act effectively as spoilers in the new Iraq. If they aren't happy, no one is going to be. The US must negotiate with the guerrilla leaders and find a win/win framework for them to come in from the cold and work alongside the Kurds and the religious Shiites. About this, US Ambassador in Baghdad Zalmay Khalilzad has been absolutely right.
4. "Iraq is not in a civil war," as Jurassic conservative Fox commentator Bill O'Reilly insists. There is a well-established social science definition of civil war put forward by Professor J. David Singer and his colleagues: "Sustained military combat, primarily internal, resulting in at least 1,000 battle-deaths per year, pitting central government forces against an insurgent force capable of effective resistance, determined by the latter's ability to inflict upon the government forces at least 5 percent of the fatalities that the insurgents sustain." (Errol A. Henderson and J. David Singer, "Civil War in the Post-Colonial World, 1946-92," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 3, May 2000.)" See my article on this in Salon.com. By Singer's definition, Iraq has been in civil war since the Iraqi government was reestablished in summer of 2004. When I have been around political scientists, as at the ISA conference, I have found that scholars in that field tend to accept Singer's definition.
5. "The second Lancet study showing 600,000 excess deaths from political and criminal violence since the US invasion is somehow flawed." Les Roberts replies here to many of the objections that were raised. See also the transcript of the Kucinich-Paul Congressional hearings on the subject. Many critics refer to the numbers of dead reported in the press as counter-arguments to Roberts et al. But "passive reporting" such as news articles never captures more than a fraction of the casualties in any war. I see deaths reported in the Arabic press all the time that never show up in the English language wire services. And, a lot of towns in Iraq don't have local newspapers and many local deaths are not reported in the national newspapers.
6. "Most deaths in Iraq are from bombings." The Lancet study found that the majority of violent deaths are from being shot.
7. "Baghdad and environs are especially violent but the death rate is lower in the rest of the country." The Lancet survey found that levels of violence in the rest of the country are similar to that in Baghdad (remember that the authors included criminal activities such as gang and smuggler turf wars in their statistics). The Shiite south is spared much Sunni-Shiite communal fighting, but criminal gangs, tribal feuds, and militias fight one another over oil and antiquities smuggling, and a lot of people are getting shot down there, too.
8. "Iraq is the central front in the war on terror." From the beginning of history until 2003 there had never been a suicide bombing in Iraq. There was no al-Qaeda in Baath-ruled Iraq. When Baath intelligence heard that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi might have entered Iraq, they grew alarmed at such an "al-Qaeda" presence and put out an APB on him! Zarqawi's so-called "al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia" was never "central" in Iraq and was never responsible for more than a fraction of the violent attacks. This assertion is supported by the outcome of a US-Jordanian operation that killed Zarqawi this year. His death had no impact whatsoever on the level of violence. There are probably only about 1,000 foreign fighters even in Iraq, and most of them are first-time volunteers, not old-time terrorists. The 50 major guerrilla cells in Sunni Arab Iraq are mostly made up of Iraqis, and are mainly: 1) Baathist or neo-Baathist, 2) Sunni revivalist or Salafi, 3) tribally-based, or 4) based in city quarters. Al-Qaeda is mainly a boogey man, invoked in Iraq on all sides, but possessing little real power or presence there. This is not to deny that radical Sunni Arab volunteers come to Iraq to blow things (and often themselves) up. They just are not more than an auxiliary to the big movements, which are Iraqi.
9. "The Sunni Arab guerrillas in places like Ramadi will follow the US home to the American mainland and commit terrorism if we leave Iraq." This assertion is just a variation on the invalid domino theory. People in Ramadi only have one beef with the United States. Its troops are going through their wives' underwear in the course of house searches every day. They don't want the US troops in their town or their homes, dictating to them that they must live under a government of Shiite clerics and Kurdish warlords (as they think of them). If the US withdrew and let the Iraqis work out a way to live with one another, people in Ramadi will be happy. They are not going to start taking flight lessons and trying to get visas to the US. This argument about following us, if it were true, would have prevented us from ever withdrawing from anyplace once we entered a war there. We'd be forever stuck in the Philippines for fear that Filipino terrorists would follow us back home. Or Korea (we moved 15,000 US troops out of South Korea not so long ago. Was that unwise? Are the thereby liberated Koreans now gunning for us?) Or how about the Dominican Republic? Haiti? Grenada? France? The argument is a crock.
10. "Setting a timetable for withdrawal from Iraq is a bad idea." Bush and others in his administration have argued that setting such a timetable would give a significant military advantage to the guerrillas fighting US forces and opposed to the new government. That assertion makes sense only if there were a prospect that the US could militarily crush the Sunni Arabs. There is no such prospect. The guerrilla war is hotter now than at any time since the US invasion. It is more widely supported by more Sunni Arabs than ever before. It is producing more violent attacks than ever before. Since we cannot defeat them short of genocide, we have to negotiate with them. And their first and most urgent demand is that the US set a timetable for withdrawal before they will consider coming into the new political system. That is, we should set a timetable in order to turn the Sunni guerrillas from combatants to a political negotiating partner. Even Sunni politicians cooperating with the US make this demand. They are disappointed with the lack of movement on the issue. How long do they remain willing to cooperate? In addition, 131 Iraqi members of parliament signed a demand that the US set a timetable for withdrawal. (138 would be a simple majority.) It is a a major demand of the Sadr Movement. In fact, the 32 Sadrist MPs withdrew from the ruling United Iraqi Alliance coalition temporarily over this issue.
In my view, Shiite leaders such as Abdul Aziz al-Hakim are repeatedly declining to negotiate in good faith with the Sunni Arabs or to take their views seriously. Al-Hakim knows that if the Sunnis give him any trouble, he can sic the Marines on them. The US presence is making it harder for Iraqi to compromise with Iraqi, which is counterproductive.
Think Progress points out that in 1999, Governor George W. Bush criticized then President Clinton for declining to set a withdrawal timetable for Kosovo, saying "Victory means exit strategy, and it’s important for the president to explain to us what the exit strategy is."
Juan Cole is President of the Global Americana Institute - Visit his website www.juancole.com
Dienstag, Dezember 26, 2006
Apartheid in the Holy Land
Desmond Tutu is the former Archbishop of Cape Town and chairman of South Africa's truth and reconciliation commission. Desmond Tutus comment from 2002 is a very direct and pointed statement.
Comment
Apartheid in the Holy Land
Desmond Tutu
Monday April 29, 2002
Guardian
In our struggle against apartheid, the great supporters were Jewish people. They almost instinctively had to be on the side of the disenfranchised, of the voiceless ones, fighting injustice, oppression and evil. I have continued to feel strongly with the Jews. I am patron of a Holocaust centre in South Africa. I believe Israel has a right to secure borders.
What is not so understandable, not justified, is what it did to another people to guarantee its existence. I've been very deeply distressed in my visit to the Holy Land; it reminded me so much of what happened to us black people in South Africa. I have seen the humiliation of the Palestinians at checkpoints and roadblocks, suffering like us when young white police officers prevented us from moving about.
On one of my visits to the Holy Land I drove to a church with the Anglican bishop in Jerusalem. I could hear tears in his voice as he pointed to Jewish settlements. I thought of the desire of Israelis for security. But what of the Palestinians who have lost their land and homes?
I have experienced Palestinians pointing to what were their homes, now occupied by Jewish Israelis. I was walking with Canon Naim Ateek (the head of the Sabeel Ecumenical Centre) in Jerusalem. He pointed and said: "Our home was over there. We were driven out of our home; it is now occupied by Israeli Jews."
My heart aches. I say why are our memories so short. Have our Jewish sisters and brothers forgotten their humiliation? Have they forgotten the collective punishment, the home demolitions, in their own history so soon? Have they turned their backs on their profound and noble religious traditions? Have they forgotten that God cares deeply about the downtrodden?
Israel will never get true security and safety through oppressing another people. A true peace can ultimately be built only on justice. We condemn the violence of suicide bombers, and we condemn the corruption of young minds taught hatred; but we also condemn the violence of military incursions in the occupied lands, and the inhumanity that won't let ambulances reach the injured.
The military action of recent days, I predict with certainty, will not provide the security and peace Israelis want; it will only intensify the hatred.
Israel has three options: revert to the previous stalemated situation; exterminate all Palestinians; or - I hope - to strive for peace based on justice, based on withdrawal from all the occupied territories, and the establishment of a viable Palestinian state on those territories side by side with Israel, both with secure borders.
We in South Africa had a relatively peaceful transition. If our madness could end as it did, it must be possible to do the same everywhere else in the world. If peace could come to South Africa, surely it can come to the Holy Land?
My brother Naim Ateek has said what we used to say: "I am not pro- this people or that. I am pro-justice, pro-freedom. I am anti- injustice, anti-oppression."
But you know as well as I do that, somehow, the Israeli government is placed on a pedestal [in the US], and to criticise it is to be immediately dubbed anti-semitic, as if the Palestinians were not semitic. I am not even anti-white, despite the madness of that group. And how did it come about that Israel was collaborating with the apartheid government on security measures?
People are scared in this country [the US], to say wrong is wrong because the Jewish lobby is powerful - very powerful. Well, so what? For goodness sake, this is God's world! We live in a moral universe. The apartheid government was very powerful, but today it no longer exists. Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, Pinochet, Milosevic, and Idi Amin were all powerful, but in the end they bit the dust.
Injustice and oppression will never prevail. Those who are powerful have to remember the litmus test that God gives to the powerful: what is your treatment of the poor, the hungry, the voiceless? And on the basis of that, God passes judgment.
We should put out a clarion call to the government of the people of Israel, to the Palestinian people and say: peace is possible, peace based on justice is possible. We will do all we can to assist you to achieve this peace, because it is God's dream, and you will be able to live amicably together as sisters and brothers.
Desmond Tutu is the former Archbishop of Cape Town and chairman of South Africa's truth and reconciliation commission. This address was given at a conference on Ending the Occupation held in Boston, Massachusetts, earlier this month. A longer version appears in the current edition of Church Times.
Comment
Apartheid in the Holy Land
Desmond Tutu
Monday April 29, 2002
Guardian
In our struggle against apartheid, the great supporters were Jewish people. They almost instinctively had to be on the side of the disenfranchised, of the voiceless ones, fighting injustice, oppression and evil. I have continued to feel strongly with the Jews. I am patron of a Holocaust centre in South Africa. I believe Israel has a right to secure borders.
What is not so understandable, not justified, is what it did to another people to guarantee its existence. I've been very deeply distressed in my visit to the Holy Land; it reminded me so much of what happened to us black people in South Africa. I have seen the humiliation of the Palestinians at checkpoints and roadblocks, suffering like us when young white police officers prevented us from moving about.
On one of my visits to the Holy Land I drove to a church with the Anglican bishop in Jerusalem. I could hear tears in his voice as he pointed to Jewish settlements. I thought of the desire of Israelis for security. But what of the Palestinians who have lost their land and homes?
I have experienced Palestinians pointing to what were their homes, now occupied by Jewish Israelis. I was walking with Canon Naim Ateek (the head of the Sabeel Ecumenical Centre) in Jerusalem. He pointed and said: "Our home was over there. We were driven out of our home; it is now occupied by Israeli Jews."
My heart aches. I say why are our memories so short. Have our Jewish sisters and brothers forgotten their humiliation? Have they forgotten the collective punishment, the home demolitions, in their own history so soon? Have they turned their backs on their profound and noble religious traditions? Have they forgotten that God cares deeply about the downtrodden?
Israel will never get true security and safety through oppressing another people. A true peace can ultimately be built only on justice. We condemn the violence of suicide bombers, and we condemn the corruption of young minds taught hatred; but we also condemn the violence of military incursions in the occupied lands, and the inhumanity that won't let ambulances reach the injured.
The military action of recent days, I predict with certainty, will not provide the security and peace Israelis want; it will only intensify the hatred.
Israel has three options: revert to the previous stalemated situation; exterminate all Palestinians; or - I hope - to strive for peace based on justice, based on withdrawal from all the occupied territories, and the establishment of a viable Palestinian state on those territories side by side with Israel, both with secure borders.
We in South Africa had a relatively peaceful transition. If our madness could end as it did, it must be possible to do the same everywhere else in the world. If peace could come to South Africa, surely it can come to the Holy Land?
My brother Naim Ateek has said what we used to say: "I am not pro- this people or that. I am pro-justice, pro-freedom. I am anti- injustice, anti-oppression."
But you know as well as I do that, somehow, the Israeli government is placed on a pedestal [in the US], and to criticise it is to be immediately dubbed anti-semitic, as if the Palestinians were not semitic. I am not even anti-white, despite the madness of that group. And how did it come about that Israel was collaborating with the apartheid government on security measures?
People are scared in this country [the US], to say wrong is wrong because the Jewish lobby is powerful - very powerful. Well, so what? For goodness sake, this is God's world! We live in a moral universe. The apartheid government was very powerful, but today it no longer exists. Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, Pinochet, Milosevic, and Idi Amin were all powerful, but in the end they bit the dust.
Injustice and oppression will never prevail. Those who are powerful have to remember the litmus test that God gives to the powerful: what is your treatment of the poor, the hungry, the voiceless? And on the basis of that, God passes judgment.
We should put out a clarion call to the government of the people of Israel, to the Palestinian people and say: peace is possible, peace based on justice is possible. We will do all we can to assist you to achieve this peace, because it is God's dream, and you will be able to live amicably together as sisters and brothers.
Desmond Tutu is the former Archbishop of Cape Town and chairman of South Africa's truth and reconciliation commission. This address was given at a conference on Ending the Occupation held in Boston, Massachusetts, earlier this month. A longer version appears in the current edition of Church Times.
Sonntag, Dezember 24, 2006
Samstag, Dezember 23, 2006
The opposite of xmas: remember the Anthrax attacks in the USA? well.... read on
It is interesting to watch how more and more rather serious and established figures are coming out with what they know and, even if one takes all those utterings with some suspicion is it impossible to ignore how strongly their stories collide with the official conspiracy theory. Interesting read and radio-interview
Impending Police State in America
Professor Boyle teaches international law at the University of Illinois, Champaign. He holds a Doctor of Law Magna Cum Laude as well as a Ph.D. in Political Science, both from Harvard University. He has also served on the Board of Directors of Amnesty International (1988-1992), and represented Bosnia- Herzegovina at the World Court.
Impending Police State in America
Interview with Professor Francis Boyle
Francis A Boyle says 9/11 was allowed to happen, war on terror is facilitating the downfall of The Republic, concentration camps are in place and US citizens are the targets
12/23/06 "CRG" --- - Alex Jones was joined on air this week by a leading American professor, practitioner of and expert on international law to discuss his detailed knowledge of the cover up of the 2001 anthrax attacks, which he is adamant were perpetrated by criminal elements of the US government in an attempt to foment a police state by killing off opposition to hardline post 9/11 legislation.
Dr Franics A. Boyle literally helped write the law with regards to terrorism, as he was responsible for drafting the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 that was passed unanimously by both Houses of Congress and signed into law by President Bush Snr.
Professor Boyle teaches international law at the University of Illinois, Champaign. He holds a Doctor of Law Magna Cum Laude as well as a Ph.D. in Political Science, both from Harvard University. He has also served on the Board of Directors of Amnesty International (1988-1992), and represented Bosnia- Herzegovina at the World Court.
The professor started off by explaining the motivation behind the October 2001 anthrax attacks:
"After the September 11th 2001 Terrorist attacks, the Bush administration tried to ram the USA PATRIOT Act through Congress, that would have, if already had not, set up a police state. And we know for a fact that the PATRIOT Act had already been drafted and was sitting on Ashcroft's desk as of September 10th.
Senators Daschle and Leahy were holding it up because they realised what this would lead to, indeed the first draft of the Patriot Act, they would have suspended the writ of habeas corpus. And all of a sudden out of nowhere come these anthrax attacks. And at the time I myself did not know precisely what was going on, either with respect to September 11th or the anthrax attacks, but then the New York Times revealed that the technology behind the letter to Senator Daschle. A trillion spores per gram, special electro-static treatment.
This is super-weapons grade Anthrax that even the United States government, in its openly proclaimed programs, and we had one before Nixon, had never developed before. So it was obvious to me that this was from a US Government lab, there is no where else you could have gotten that."
Dr Boyle proceeded to call a very high level official in the FBI who deals with terrorism and counter-terrorism, Spike Bowman, whom he had met at a terrorism conference at the University of Michigan Law School.
He told Bowman that the only people that would have the capability to carry out the attacks were people working on US government programs on Anthrax and with access to high level a bio-safety lab. Dr Boyle went through all the names, the contractors and the labs for Anthrax work with the FBI's Bowman.
Bowman then informed Dr Boyle that the FBI was working with Fort Detrick on the matter, to which he responded that Fort Detrick could really be the main problem.
It was documented at the time that the anthrax strain used was military grade. This was widely reported in 2002 in publications such as the New Scientist.
"Soon after I had informed Bowman of this information, the FBI authorised the destruction of the AMES cultural Anthrax database." The Professor continued.
The destruction of the anthrax culture collection at Ames, IA., from which the Ft. Detrick lab got its pathogens, was blatant destruction of evidence as it meant that there was no way of finding out which strain was sent to who to develop the larger breed of anthrax used in the attacks. The trail of genetic evidence would have led directly back to a secret but officially-sponsored US government biowarfare program that was illegal and criminal.
"Clearly for the FBI to have authorised this was obstruction of justice, a federal crime. That collection should have been preserved and protected as evidence. That's the DNA, the fingerprints right there. It later came out of course that this was AMES strain anthrax that was behind the Daschle and Leahy letter."
At that point Boyle says it became very clear to him that there was a cover up in operation by the FBI. He points out that later on on reading one of David Ray Griffin's books on the 9/11 attacks, he discovered that Agent Bowman was the same FBI agent who sabotaged the FISA warrant for access to Zacarious Moussaoui's computer, which contained information that could have facilitated the prevention of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
Later on Bowman was promoted and given a decoration, presumably because he did such a fine job on Moussaoui's computer and also on the anthrax.
So it was to be that the patriot act was rammed through, because the opposition from Leahy and Daschle, whom they had tried to kill, disappeared. Congress and even the House itself officially shut down for the first time in the history of the Republic. The Senate refused to shut down. Dr Boyle commented that he believes this to be one of the biggest political crimes in the history of America.
The professor agreed that actions such as this and legislation such as the Patriot act and the new Military Commissions act are the precursors to a military dictatorship.
"And remember that the first draft of the Patriot act that sat on Ashcroft's desk before 9/11, and also remember that Ashcroft was flying around in a private jet because he was told that there was going to be a terrorist attack with airplanes, so all this had been planned.
They were going to move to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, which is all that really separates us from a police state. And that is what they have done now with respect to enemy combatants."
With regards to 9/11 itself the professor asserted that it is clear Bush, Rice, Tennet, Ashcroft and other Bush Administration officials all knew a terrorist attack was coming and that the attacks were at the very least allowed to go ahead.
"They let it happen because they wanted a war and they wanted a police state, all the elements for a war against Afghanistan were there in place, even the military force in the gulf were there on the scene, there were massive military forces in the gulf, in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean, in the Arabian Ocean before September 11th poised for an attack, whether it was going to be Afghanistan or Iraq would be decided by Bush and the rest of them."
The professor pointed out that it is now being argued by lawmakers that the 14th amendment does not mean what it has been taken to mean and that under the Military Commissions Act any US citizen can be stripped of their citizenship and thus be labeled an enemy combatant.
"So in other words they are taken the position that in some point in time if they want to, they can unilaterally round up United States native born citizens, as they did for Japanese Americans in World War Two, and stick us into concentration camps. That is correct. They haven't actually yet done it but my guess is that the papers have been drawn up... and we know that the FEMA camps are out there.
So it's clear that the Bush people, I guess they are waiting for some other terrorist attack, another anthrax attack, who knows what, and then they will proceed to invoke these emergency orders."
Dr Boyle believes that the domestic police state is a seen as a must by the neoconservatives who are pushing for dominance in the middle east in order to quell dissent from an American public who, the informed majority of, clearly will not stand for such aggression in their names.
The professor then went on to talk about the sickness of the neoconservative sympathizers who are pushing for the practice of torture to be made legal. Legislators such as John Yu and Professor Goldsmith of Harvard Law School. Dr Boyle believes that there is a move afoot to infiltrate both the legal profession and legal education with opinion and legislature that subverts long established US law. His warning is stark:
"The Nazis did the exact same thing too. They had their lawyers infiltrating law schools. Carl Schmidt was the worst and he was the mentor to Leo Strauss, the founder of the neoconservatives. So the same phenomena that started out in Nazi Germany is happening here and I exaggerate not... we could all be tortured, we could all be treated this way."
Dr Boyle stressed that in order to seek justice over the anthrax attacks it is vital to keep the pressure on Senator Leahy who will apparently be becoming the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Leahy will have subpoena power and investigative power, and if anyone would have motivation to try to get to the bottom of the attacks, it would be him.
Dr Boyle ended by urging readers and listeners to become informed and spread this information. He also admitted that in the Summer of 2004 he was interrogated by an agent with the CIA/FBI joint terrorism task force. The agent tried to recruit Dr Boyle as an informant to provide the FBI with information on his Arab and Muslim clients. When he refused the FBI placed him on all of the government's terrorism watch lists and he now finds it very difficult to travel in and out of the US.
Impending Police State in America
Professor Boyle teaches international law at the University of Illinois, Champaign. He holds a Doctor of Law Magna Cum Laude as well as a Ph.D. in Political Science, both from Harvard University. He has also served on the Board of Directors of Amnesty International (1988-1992), and represented Bosnia- Herzegovina at the World Court.
Impending Police State in America
Interview with Professor Francis Boyle
Francis A Boyle says 9/11 was allowed to happen, war on terror is facilitating the downfall of The Republic, concentration camps are in place and US citizens are the targets
12/23/06 "CRG" --- - Alex Jones was joined on air this week by a leading American professor, practitioner of and expert on international law to discuss his detailed knowledge of the cover up of the 2001 anthrax attacks, which he is adamant were perpetrated by criminal elements of the US government in an attempt to foment a police state by killing off opposition to hardline post 9/11 legislation.
Dr Franics A. Boyle literally helped write the law with regards to terrorism, as he was responsible for drafting the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 that was passed unanimously by both Houses of Congress and signed into law by President Bush Snr.
Professor Boyle teaches international law at the University of Illinois, Champaign. He holds a Doctor of Law Magna Cum Laude as well as a Ph.D. in Political Science, both from Harvard University. He has also served on the Board of Directors of Amnesty International (1988-1992), and represented Bosnia- Herzegovina at the World Court.
The professor started off by explaining the motivation behind the October 2001 anthrax attacks:
"After the September 11th 2001 Terrorist attacks, the Bush administration tried to ram the USA PATRIOT Act through Congress, that would have, if already had not, set up a police state. And we know for a fact that the PATRIOT Act had already been drafted and was sitting on Ashcroft's desk as of September 10th.
Senators Daschle and Leahy were holding it up because they realised what this would lead to, indeed the first draft of the Patriot Act, they would have suspended the writ of habeas corpus. And all of a sudden out of nowhere come these anthrax attacks. And at the time I myself did not know precisely what was going on, either with respect to September 11th or the anthrax attacks, but then the New York Times revealed that the technology behind the letter to Senator Daschle. A trillion spores per gram, special electro-static treatment.
This is super-weapons grade Anthrax that even the United States government, in its openly proclaimed programs, and we had one before Nixon, had never developed before. So it was obvious to me that this was from a US Government lab, there is no where else you could have gotten that."
Dr Boyle proceeded to call a very high level official in the FBI who deals with terrorism and counter-terrorism, Spike Bowman, whom he had met at a terrorism conference at the University of Michigan Law School.
He told Bowman that the only people that would have the capability to carry out the attacks were people working on US government programs on Anthrax and with access to high level a bio-safety lab. Dr Boyle went through all the names, the contractors and the labs for Anthrax work with the FBI's Bowman.
Bowman then informed Dr Boyle that the FBI was working with Fort Detrick on the matter, to which he responded that Fort Detrick could really be the main problem.
It was documented at the time that the anthrax strain used was military grade. This was widely reported in 2002 in publications such as the New Scientist.
"Soon after I had informed Bowman of this information, the FBI authorised the destruction of the AMES cultural Anthrax database." The Professor continued.
The destruction of the anthrax culture collection at Ames, IA., from which the Ft. Detrick lab got its pathogens, was blatant destruction of evidence as it meant that there was no way of finding out which strain was sent to who to develop the larger breed of anthrax used in the attacks. The trail of genetic evidence would have led directly back to a secret but officially-sponsored US government biowarfare program that was illegal and criminal.
"Clearly for the FBI to have authorised this was obstruction of justice, a federal crime. That collection should have been preserved and protected as evidence. That's the DNA, the fingerprints right there. It later came out of course that this was AMES strain anthrax that was behind the Daschle and Leahy letter."
At that point Boyle says it became very clear to him that there was a cover up in operation by the FBI. He points out that later on on reading one of David Ray Griffin's books on the 9/11 attacks, he discovered that Agent Bowman was the same FBI agent who sabotaged the FISA warrant for access to Zacarious Moussaoui's computer, which contained information that could have facilitated the prevention of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
Later on Bowman was promoted and given a decoration, presumably because he did such a fine job on Moussaoui's computer and also on the anthrax.
So it was to be that the patriot act was rammed through, because the opposition from Leahy and Daschle, whom they had tried to kill, disappeared. Congress and even the House itself officially shut down for the first time in the history of the Republic. The Senate refused to shut down. Dr Boyle commented that he believes this to be one of the biggest political crimes in the history of America.
The professor agreed that actions such as this and legislation such as the Patriot act and the new Military Commissions act are the precursors to a military dictatorship.
"And remember that the first draft of the Patriot act that sat on Ashcroft's desk before 9/11, and also remember that Ashcroft was flying around in a private jet because he was told that there was going to be a terrorist attack with airplanes, so all this had been planned.
They were going to move to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, which is all that really separates us from a police state. And that is what they have done now with respect to enemy combatants."
With regards to 9/11 itself the professor asserted that it is clear Bush, Rice, Tennet, Ashcroft and other Bush Administration officials all knew a terrorist attack was coming and that the attacks were at the very least allowed to go ahead.
"They let it happen because they wanted a war and they wanted a police state, all the elements for a war against Afghanistan were there in place, even the military force in the gulf were there on the scene, there were massive military forces in the gulf, in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean, in the Arabian Ocean before September 11th poised for an attack, whether it was going to be Afghanistan or Iraq would be decided by Bush and the rest of them."
The professor pointed out that it is now being argued by lawmakers that the 14th amendment does not mean what it has been taken to mean and that under the Military Commissions Act any US citizen can be stripped of their citizenship and thus be labeled an enemy combatant.
"So in other words they are taken the position that in some point in time if they want to, they can unilaterally round up United States native born citizens, as they did for Japanese Americans in World War Two, and stick us into concentration camps. That is correct. They haven't actually yet done it but my guess is that the papers have been drawn up... and we know that the FEMA camps are out there.
So it's clear that the Bush people, I guess they are waiting for some other terrorist attack, another anthrax attack, who knows what, and then they will proceed to invoke these emergency orders."
Dr Boyle believes that the domestic police state is a seen as a must by the neoconservatives who are pushing for dominance in the middle east in order to quell dissent from an American public who, the informed majority of, clearly will not stand for such aggression in their names.
The professor then went on to talk about the sickness of the neoconservative sympathizers who are pushing for the practice of torture to be made legal. Legislators such as John Yu and Professor Goldsmith of Harvard Law School. Dr Boyle believes that there is a move afoot to infiltrate both the legal profession and legal education with opinion and legislature that subverts long established US law. His warning is stark:
"The Nazis did the exact same thing too. They had their lawyers infiltrating law schools. Carl Schmidt was the worst and he was the mentor to Leo Strauss, the founder of the neoconservatives. So the same phenomena that started out in Nazi Germany is happening here and I exaggerate not... we could all be tortured, we could all be treated this way."
Dr Boyle stressed that in order to seek justice over the anthrax attacks it is vital to keep the pressure on Senator Leahy who will apparently be becoming the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Leahy will have subpoena power and investigative power, and if anyone would have motivation to try to get to the bottom of the attacks, it would be him.
Dr Boyle ended by urging readers and listeners to become informed and spread this information. He also admitted that in the Summer of 2004 he was interrogated by an agent with the CIA/FBI joint terrorism task force. The agent tried to recruit Dr Boyle as an informant to provide the FBI with information on his Arab and Muslim clients. When he refused the FBI placed him on all of the government's terrorism watch lists and he now finds it very difficult to travel in and out of the US.
xmas special: Vielleicht ginge es ja doch - wenn sie nur wollten, die Religiösen.
....aber es dauert bei denen halt immer Jahrhunderte. Trotzdem, ein Anfang:
23. Dezember 2006, Neue Zürcher Zeitung
Buddha, Jesus, Mohammed & Co. unter einem Dach
Ein Haus der Religionen - von der Vision zum Vorzeigeobjekt
Einmal mehr geht von Bethlehem eine Idee aus, die immer mehr Leute in ihren Bann zieht. Diesmal ist es allerdings nicht das palästinensische Bethlehem, sondern der gleichnamige Stadtteil von Bern, der bis in die höchsten politischen Kreise der Bundesstadt Furore macht. Lange bevor der sogenannte Kampf der Kulturen den Stammtisch eroberte, wurde im Westen Berns eine Vision entwickelt, die sich schon bald in einem sichtbaren Vorzeigeobjekt mit internationaler Ausstrahlung konkretisieren könnte. Daran glauben immerhin der Berner Stadtpräsident, die Regierung, die Regierungsstatthalterin, das Berner Stadtparlament, ein renommiertes Architekturbüro und auch die Bundeskanzlerin der Eidgenossenschaft, um nur ein paar der bekanntesten Aushängeschilder des Projekts zu nennen. Konkret geht es um ein Haus der Religionen, in dem Muslime, Buddhisten, Hindus, Juden, Christen und andere mehr ihre eigenen Gebetsräume hätten und nebeneinander ihren religiösen Verpflichtungen nachkommen könnten, sich zudem in Konferenz- und Aufenthaltsräumen zum interkulturellen Dialog begegnen und nicht zuletzt auch gemeinsam feiern würden.
Prophetische Initianten
Das Projekt scheint sich perfekt in die heutige Zeit zu fügen und könnte als Antwort auf die gegenwärtige Diskussion um den Bau von Minaretten und Tempeln interpretiert werden. Insofern sind jenen Leuten quasi prophetische Eigenschaften zu attestieren, die vor gut sechs Jahren die Idee aufgenommen und trotz finanziellen Schwierigkeiten weiterverfolgt und schliesslich zu breiter Akzeptanz gebracht haben. Als Promotor der ersten Stunde wirkte der «Runde Tisch der Religionen», der 1993 in Bern gegründet wurde und nicht nur für die Schweiz einmalig ist. Vertreter der reformierten und der katholischen Kirche, der islamischen Gemeinschaften, der jüdischen Gemeinde, der Hindus (vor allem tamilischen Ursprungs) und der buddhistischen Gruppen treffen sich seither regelmässig - nicht zu hochgestochenen theologischen Diskussionen, sondern zur Lösung konkreter Probleme in den Schulen oder bei der Anwendung religiöser Speisevorschriften in Spitälern und Gefängnissen. Am «Runden Tisch der Religionen» wurde auch eine pragmatische Lösung für ein separates Grabfeld für Muslime gefunden, ein Modell, das andere Städte inzwischen kopiert haben. Das Vertrauensverhältnis unter den Teilnehmern des «Runden Tisches» ist so gross, dass der Vertreter der Muslime einmal sagte, die islamischen Anliegen in Bern würden am besten durch die christlichen Kirchen und den Rabbiner vertreten.
Die Idee eines Hauses der Religionen stammt ursprünglich von einem, der sich selber als «spärlichen Kirchgänger» bezeichnet. Christian Jaquet, früherer Studienleiter an der Berner Fachhochschule für Gestaltung, Kunst und Konservierung, verfasste 1998 im Auftrag des Stadtplanungsamts Bern eine Imagestudie zum Stadtteil Bümpliz- Bethlehem und verliebte sich ein bisschen in das Randquartier mit nicht gerade bestem Ruf. Er beschrieb Bern West mit den Hochhäusern und Arbeitersiedlungen als Stück Schweiz, das noch nicht fertig gestaltet sei und deshalb noch Neues ermögliche. Konkret regte er den Bau eines Hauses der Kulturen und Religionen an, wofür die Bundesstadt und namentlich Bethlehem der prädestinierte Standort wäre. Er nannte auch ein mögliches Terrain für den Bau, nämlich das brachliegende stadteigene Land zwischen Bahngleisen und Autobahn, das schon von seinem Namen her zu Höherem bestimmt scheint; es heisst Europaplatz.
Vom Hinterzimmer ins Schaufenster
Der «Runde Tisch der Religionen» nahm die Idee auf und setzte eine Arbeitsgruppe zur Weiterverfolgung des Projekts ein. Die Fäden zog Hartmut Haas von der Herrnhuter Brüdergemeine, einer der Ökumene verpflichteten Gruppe innerhalb der traditionellen Kirchen. Diese hatte eine hauptamtliche Stelle für multikulturelle und interreligiöse Arbeit in Bern West geschaffen und leistete damit einen wesentlichen Beitrag auf dem Weg von der Vision zum konkreten Projekt. Aus der Arbeitsgruppe wurde ein Verein «Haus der Religionen - Dialog der Kulturen», dem ein halbes Dutzend Religionen, gut zwanzig Institutionen sowie ein paar hundert zahlende Mitglieder angehören. Unterstützt wird das Projekt zudem von einem rund 1500 Personen zählenden Freundeskreis. Für das Projekt liess sich schliesslich auch der Architekt Marco Ryter vom Büro Bauart begeistern. Zusammen mit dem Architekturbüro Urbanoffice aus Amsterdam/Zürich und dem Projektleiter Stefan Graf von Bauart erstellte er - notabene auf eigene Kosten - die Pläne für den Neubau am Europaplatz. Auf Antrag der Stadtregierung genehmigte das Stadtparlament die Abgabe des entsprechenden Terrains zu Vorzugsbedingungen, im März dieses Jahres wurde eine Stiftung «Europaplatz - Haus der Religionen» gegründet, die die erforderlichen finanziellen Mittel für das Vorhaben aufbringen soll, und für Anfang 2007 wird mit der Baubewilligung gerechnet.
Innerhalb der letzten zwei Jahre hat das Projekt einen rasanten Weg zurückgelegt: von der Vision in die Realisierungsphase, vom Pfarrhaus ins Regierungsgebäude und vom Kirchenblatt in die Zeitschrift «Geo», die dem inzwischen auf internationale Beachtung stossenden Vorhaben einen längeren Artikel widmete. Interessanterweise haben sich Persönlichkeiten für das Projekt begeistern lassen, die mit Religion nicht viel am Hut haben. Zum Beispiel der Architekt Marco Ryter. Er hat eben den Lehrgang «Moderation und Mediation im interkulturellen und interreligiösen Dialog» abgeschlossen, den die Berner Fachhochschule zusammen mit dem Verein «Haus der Religionen - Dialog der Kulturen» anbietet. Im tabufreien Gespräch zwischen Menschen, die ein Dutzend Nationalitäten und ein halbes Dutzend Religionen repräsentierten, kam es zu Begegnungen, die er sich zuvor nie hätte vorstellen können. Etwa mit dem somalischstämmigen Imam von Bern, den er inzwischen als einen seiner liebsten Freunde bezeichnet und mit dem er sich auch beim Kochen bestens versteht.
Zwischen Stade de Suisse und New York
Auch Christoph Reichenau, der frühere Vizedirektor des Bundesamts für Kultur und heutige Leiter der Abteilung Kulturelles der Stadt Bern, ist ein überzeugter Anhänger des Projekts und sagt klipp und klar: «Die Stadt will dieses Haus.» Das Haus der Religionen ist offizieller Bestandteil der Kulturförderungsstrategie, und im Budget fürs Jahr 2008 ist bereits ein namhafter Beitrag an den Betrieb vorgesehen. Reichenau, obwohl selber nicht religiös, hat keine Berührungsängste. Für ihn ist die Pflege religiöser Riten und Bräuche ein eminenter Bestandteil der Kultur; zentrale Künste seien schliesslich aus dem Glauben entstanden. Er hebt sich mit dieser Offenheit wohltuend von den momentan hoch im Kurs stehenden staatlichen Integrationsstellen ab, die keine religiösen Projekte finanzieren, obwohl die Kirchen wesentliche Schnittstellen der Ausländerintegration sind. Lieber unterstützt man beispielsweise ein «Ethnopoly» - ein blauäugiges Spiel zwischen verschiedenen Rassen. Immerhin hat der Verein «Haus der Religionen - Dialog der Kulturen» mit dem zweiten Teil seines Namens diese strikte Barriere geknackt, wenn nicht pekuniär, so doch zumindest ideell: Er wurde mit dem Integrationspreis der Stadt Bern ausgezeichnet.
Wie Christoph Reichenau gehört auch Regierungsstatthalterin Regula Mader dem Stiftungsrat «Europaplatz - Haus der Religionen» an. Als Staatsvertreterin liegt ihr an einem partnerschaftlichen Verhältnis zwischen Kirche und Staat, in dem sowohl Kritik wie auch offene Auseinandersetzung Platz haben. Sie sieht das Projekt «Haus der Religionen» als einen Markstein auf dem Weg zu einer friedlichen Gesellschaft. Präsidiert wird die Stiftung, deren wichtigste Aufgabe es ist, den Bau finanziell sicherzustellen, von Guido Albisetti, Vorsitzender der Geschäftsleitung der Von Graffenried Holding AG. Er glaubt sowohl an das Projekt wie an den Standort, den er wegen der optimalen Anbindung an Autobahn und öffentlichen Verkehr als genial bezeichnet. Einen Erfolg kann die Stiftung bereits verbuchen: Zuwendungen werden als steuerfrei anerkannt. Neben privaten Mäzenen und Legaten sind auch Beiträge aus dem kantonalen Lotteriefonds sowie aus den Prägegewinnen des Bundes denkbar.
Für den auf insgesamt 60 Millionen Franken veranschlagten Bau ist eine sogenannte Mantelnutzung, ähnlich wie bei den neuen Stadien, vorgesehen. Die Stiftung würde mit rund 6 Millionen Franken Stockwerkeigentümer jenes Gebäudeteils, der als eigentliches Haus der Religionen dienen soll. Laut dem Architekten Marco Ryter sind Investoren bereits in den Startlöchern. So soll beispielsweise die Accor-Gruppe daran interessiert sein, einen Teil des Neubaus als sogenanntes Suite-Hotel zu nutzen für Personen, die sich beruflich mehr als nur gerade eine Nacht in Bern aufhalten. Die Hotelgruppe hat ihr Interesse untermauert, indem sie die Anpassung des Vorprojekts an ihre Bedürfnisse finanzierte. Ein weiterer Partner ist im Bereich betreutes Wohnen in Sicht. Es ginge nicht nur um Betagte, sondern beispielsweise um Wohnungen für Botschaftsangestellte, denen gewisse Dienstleistungen offeriert würden, unter anderem ein Sicherheitsdienst rund um die Uhr. Der ästhetische «Unort» im Fadenkreuz von Autobahn und Bahngleisen, wo immerhin bereits das monumentale Verwaltungsgebäude der Direktion für Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit (Deza) steht, könnte in den obersten Gefilden mit Sicht auf die Stadt auch für die urbane Generation 50 plus interessant sein, meint der Architekt: ein Wohnfeeling sozusagen wie in New York, und statt im eigenen Gastzimmer würde man Freunde im hauseigenen Hotel unterbringen.
Der Weg ist ein bisschen das Ziel
Während die Politiker das Haus der Religionen bereits als neuen Anziehungspunkt der Bundesstadt sehen, stösst man bei den Initianten der ersten Stunde auf fast überirdische Gelassenheit. Obwohl die Baubewilligung noch aussteht, gibt es für sie das Haus der Religionen bereits als «work in progress». Die Nutzungsvereinbarungen mit den interessierten Religionsgemeinschaften sind unter Dach, und seit vier Monaten leben die verschiedenen Religionen in einer dem Abbruch geweihten Fabrikationshalle mitten in Bern bereits das Haus der Zukunft. Muslime, die sich sonst in einer früheren Autoeinstellhalle zum Gebet versammeln, Hindus, die ihren Tempel unter den Türmen der Kehrichtverbrennungsanlage verstecken mussten, Buddhisten, die in einer ausgedienten Garage meditieren, nisten sich nach und nach in der riesigen Halle ein, die die Stadt dem Verein zur Nutzung überlassen hat, bis das visionäre Haus der Religionen tatsächlich verwirklicht ist. Für Vereinspräsident Hartmut Haas geht es darum, Raum zu schaffen, damit ein vernünftiges Gespräch zwischen Religionen, Kulturen und Gesellschaft möglich wird und die Entstehung religiöser Ghettos verhindert wird. Es handle sich letztlich nicht um ein religiöses, sondern um ein gesellschaftliches Projekt.
Für den Kulturbeauftragten Christoph Reichenau besteht deshalb kein Zweifel, dass das Haus der Religionen auch tatsächlich gebaut und das Projekt realisiert wird - «sonst macht unsere Gesellschaft etwas falsch». Und wenn es trotz den bereits investierten Geldern doch noch schiefgehen sollte? «Dann geht es höchstens so schief wie mit dem Christkind», sagt der Präsident des Vereins «Haus der Religionen - Dialog der Kulturen». «Ein Gott gehört doch nicht in einen Stall und endet dann am Kreuz. Ist da etwas schiefgegangen? Die Idee jedenfalls lebt noch immer.»
Monika Rosenberg
23. Dezember 2006, Neue Zürcher Zeitung
Buddha, Jesus, Mohammed & Co. unter einem Dach
Ein Haus der Religionen - von der Vision zum Vorzeigeobjekt
Einmal mehr geht von Bethlehem eine Idee aus, die immer mehr Leute in ihren Bann zieht. Diesmal ist es allerdings nicht das palästinensische Bethlehem, sondern der gleichnamige Stadtteil von Bern, der bis in die höchsten politischen Kreise der Bundesstadt Furore macht. Lange bevor der sogenannte Kampf der Kulturen den Stammtisch eroberte, wurde im Westen Berns eine Vision entwickelt, die sich schon bald in einem sichtbaren Vorzeigeobjekt mit internationaler Ausstrahlung konkretisieren könnte. Daran glauben immerhin der Berner Stadtpräsident, die Regierung, die Regierungsstatthalterin, das Berner Stadtparlament, ein renommiertes Architekturbüro und auch die Bundeskanzlerin der Eidgenossenschaft, um nur ein paar der bekanntesten Aushängeschilder des Projekts zu nennen. Konkret geht es um ein Haus der Religionen, in dem Muslime, Buddhisten, Hindus, Juden, Christen und andere mehr ihre eigenen Gebetsräume hätten und nebeneinander ihren religiösen Verpflichtungen nachkommen könnten, sich zudem in Konferenz- und Aufenthaltsräumen zum interkulturellen Dialog begegnen und nicht zuletzt auch gemeinsam feiern würden.
Prophetische Initianten
Das Projekt scheint sich perfekt in die heutige Zeit zu fügen und könnte als Antwort auf die gegenwärtige Diskussion um den Bau von Minaretten und Tempeln interpretiert werden. Insofern sind jenen Leuten quasi prophetische Eigenschaften zu attestieren, die vor gut sechs Jahren die Idee aufgenommen und trotz finanziellen Schwierigkeiten weiterverfolgt und schliesslich zu breiter Akzeptanz gebracht haben. Als Promotor der ersten Stunde wirkte der «Runde Tisch der Religionen», der 1993 in Bern gegründet wurde und nicht nur für die Schweiz einmalig ist. Vertreter der reformierten und der katholischen Kirche, der islamischen Gemeinschaften, der jüdischen Gemeinde, der Hindus (vor allem tamilischen Ursprungs) und der buddhistischen Gruppen treffen sich seither regelmässig - nicht zu hochgestochenen theologischen Diskussionen, sondern zur Lösung konkreter Probleme in den Schulen oder bei der Anwendung religiöser Speisevorschriften in Spitälern und Gefängnissen. Am «Runden Tisch der Religionen» wurde auch eine pragmatische Lösung für ein separates Grabfeld für Muslime gefunden, ein Modell, das andere Städte inzwischen kopiert haben. Das Vertrauensverhältnis unter den Teilnehmern des «Runden Tisches» ist so gross, dass der Vertreter der Muslime einmal sagte, die islamischen Anliegen in Bern würden am besten durch die christlichen Kirchen und den Rabbiner vertreten.
Die Idee eines Hauses der Religionen stammt ursprünglich von einem, der sich selber als «spärlichen Kirchgänger» bezeichnet. Christian Jaquet, früherer Studienleiter an der Berner Fachhochschule für Gestaltung, Kunst und Konservierung, verfasste 1998 im Auftrag des Stadtplanungsamts Bern eine Imagestudie zum Stadtteil Bümpliz- Bethlehem und verliebte sich ein bisschen in das Randquartier mit nicht gerade bestem Ruf. Er beschrieb Bern West mit den Hochhäusern und Arbeitersiedlungen als Stück Schweiz, das noch nicht fertig gestaltet sei und deshalb noch Neues ermögliche. Konkret regte er den Bau eines Hauses der Kulturen und Religionen an, wofür die Bundesstadt und namentlich Bethlehem der prädestinierte Standort wäre. Er nannte auch ein mögliches Terrain für den Bau, nämlich das brachliegende stadteigene Land zwischen Bahngleisen und Autobahn, das schon von seinem Namen her zu Höherem bestimmt scheint; es heisst Europaplatz.
Vom Hinterzimmer ins Schaufenster
Der «Runde Tisch der Religionen» nahm die Idee auf und setzte eine Arbeitsgruppe zur Weiterverfolgung des Projekts ein. Die Fäden zog Hartmut Haas von der Herrnhuter Brüdergemeine, einer der Ökumene verpflichteten Gruppe innerhalb der traditionellen Kirchen. Diese hatte eine hauptamtliche Stelle für multikulturelle und interreligiöse Arbeit in Bern West geschaffen und leistete damit einen wesentlichen Beitrag auf dem Weg von der Vision zum konkreten Projekt. Aus der Arbeitsgruppe wurde ein Verein «Haus der Religionen - Dialog der Kulturen», dem ein halbes Dutzend Religionen, gut zwanzig Institutionen sowie ein paar hundert zahlende Mitglieder angehören. Unterstützt wird das Projekt zudem von einem rund 1500 Personen zählenden Freundeskreis. Für das Projekt liess sich schliesslich auch der Architekt Marco Ryter vom Büro Bauart begeistern. Zusammen mit dem Architekturbüro Urbanoffice aus Amsterdam/Zürich und dem Projektleiter Stefan Graf von Bauart erstellte er - notabene auf eigene Kosten - die Pläne für den Neubau am Europaplatz. Auf Antrag der Stadtregierung genehmigte das Stadtparlament die Abgabe des entsprechenden Terrains zu Vorzugsbedingungen, im März dieses Jahres wurde eine Stiftung «Europaplatz - Haus der Religionen» gegründet, die die erforderlichen finanziellen Mittel für das Vorhaben aufbringen soll, und für Anfang 2007 wird mit der Baubewilligung gerechnet.
Innerhalb der letzten zwei Jahre hat das Projekt einen rasanten Weg zurückgelegt: von der Vision in die Realisierungsphase, vom Pfarrhaus ins Regierungsgebäude und vom Kirchenblatt in die Zeitschrift «Geo», die dem inzwischen auf internationale Beachtung stossenden Vorhaben einen längeren Artikel widmete. Interessanterweise haben sich Persönlichkeiten für das Projekt begeistern lassen, die mit Religion nicht viel am Hut haben. Zum Beispiel der Architekt Marco Ryter. Er hat eben den Lehrgang «Moderation und Mediation im interkulturellen und interreligiösen Dialog» abgeschlossen, den die Berner Fachhochschule zusammen mit dem Verein «Haus der Religionen - Dialog der Kulturen» anbietet. Im tabufreien Gespräch zwischen Menschen, die ein Dutzend Nationalitäten und ein halbes Dutzend Religionen repräsentierten, kam es zu Begegnungen, die er sich zuvor nie hätte vorstellen können. Etwa mit dem somalischstämmigen Imam von Bern, den er inzwischen als einen seiner liebsten Freunde bezeichnet und mit dem er sich auch beim Kochen bestens versteht.
Zwischen Stade de Suisse und New York
Auch Christoph Reichenau, der frühere Vizedirektor des Bundesamts für Kultur und heutige Leiter der Abteilung Kulturelles der Stadt Bern, ist ein überzeugter Anhänger des Projekts und sagt klipp und klar: «Die Stadt will dieses Haus.» Das Haus der Religionen ist offizieller Bestandteil der Kulturförderungsstrategie, und im Budget fürs Jahr 2008 ist bereits ein namhafter Beitrag an den Betrieb vorgesehen. Reichenau, obwohl selber nicht religiös, hat keine Berührungsängste. Für ihn ist die Pflege religiöser Riten und Bräuche ein eminenter Bestandteil der Kultur; zentrale Künste seien schliesslich aus dem Glauben entstanden. Er hebt sich mit dieser Offenheit wohltuend von den momentan hoch im Kurs stehenden staatlichen Integrationsstellen ab, die keine religiösen Projekte finanzieren, obwohl die Kirchen wesentliche Schnittstellen der Ausländerintegration sind. Lieber unterstützt man beispielsweise ein «Ethnopoly» - ein blauäugiges Spiel zwischen verschiedenen Rassen. Immerhin hat der Verein «Haus der Religionen - Dialog der Kulturen» mit dem zweiten Teil seines Namens diese strikte Barriere geknackt, wenn nicht pekuniär, so doch zumindest ideell: Er wurde mit dem Integrationspreis der Stadt Bern ausgezeichnet.
Wie Christoph Reichenau gehört auch Regierungsstatthalterin Regula Mader dem Stiftungsrat «Europaplatz - Haus der Religionen» an. Als Staatsvertreterin liegt ihr an einem partnerschaftlichen Verhältnis zwischen Kirche und Staat, in dem sowohl Kritik wie auch offene Auseinandersetzung Platz haben. Sie sieht das Projekt «Haus der Religionen» als einen Markstein auf dem Weg zu einer friedlichen Gesellschaft. Präsidiert wird die Stiftung, deren wichtigste Aufgabe es ist, den Bau finanziell sicherzustellen, von Guido Albisetti, Vorsitzender der Geschäftsleitung der Von Graffenried Holding AG. Er glaubt sowohl an das Projekt wie an den Standort, den er wegen der optimalen Anbindung an Autobahn und öffentlichen Verkehr als genial bezeichnet. Einen Erfolg kann die Stiftung bereits verbuchen: Zuwendungen werden als steuerfrei anerkannt. Neben privaten Mäzenen und Legaten sind auch Beiträge aus dem kantonalen Lotteriefonds sowie aus den Prägegewinnen des Bundes denkbar.
Für den auf insgesamt 60 Millionen Franken veranschlagten Bau ist eine sogenannte Mantelnutzung, ähnlich wie bei den neuen Stadien, vorgesehen. Die Stiftung würde mit rund 6 Millionen Franken Stockwerkeigentümer jenes Gebäudeteils, der als eigentliches Haus der Religionen dienen soll. Laut dem Architekten Marco Ryter sind Investoren bereits in den Startlöchern. So soll beispielsweise die Accor-Gruppe daran interessiert sein, einen Teil des Neubaus als sogenanntes Suite-Hotel zu nutzen für Personen, die sich beruflich mehr als nur gerade eine Nacht in Bern aufhalten. Die Hotelgruppe hat ihr Interesse untermauert, indem sie die Anpassung des Vorprojekts an ihre Bedürfnisse finanzierte. Ein weiterer Partner ist im Bereich betreutes Wohnen in Sicht. Es ginge nicht nur um Betagte, sondern beispielsweise um Wohnungen für Botschaftsangestellte, denen gewisse Dienstleistungen offeriert würden, unter anderem ein Sicherheitsdienst rund um die Uhr. Der ästhetische «Unort» im Fadenkreuz von Autobahn und Bahngleisen, wo immerhin bereits das monumentale Verwaltungsgebäude der Direktion für Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit (Deza) steht, könnte in den obersten Gefilden mit Sicht auf die Stadt auch für die urbane Generation 50 plus interessant sein, meint der Architekt: ein Wohnfeeling sozusagen wie in New York, und statt im eigenen Gastzimmer würde man Freunde im hauseigenen Hotel unterbringen.
Der Weg ist ein bisschen das Ziel
Während die Politiker das Haus der Religionen bereits als neuen Anziehungspunkt der Bundesstadt sehen, stösst man bei den Initianten der ersten Stunde auf fast überirdische Gelassenheit. Obwohl die Baubewilligung noch aussteht, gibt es für sie das Haus der Religionen bereits als «work in progress». Die Nutzungsvereinbarungen mit den interessierten Religionsgemeinschaften sind unter Dach, und seit vier Monaten leben die verschiedenen Religionen in einer dem Abbruch geweihten Fabrikationshalle mitten in Bern bereits das Haus der Zukunft. Muslime, die sich sonst in einer früheren Autoeinstellhalle zum Gebet versammeln, Hindus, die ihren Tempel unter den Türmen der Kehrichtverbrennungsanlage verstecken mussten, Buddhisten, die in einer ausgedienten Garage meditieren, nisten sich nach und nach in der riesigen Halle ein, die die Stadt dem Verein zur Nutzung überlassen hat, bis das visionäre Haus der Religionen tatsächlich verwirklicht ist. Für Vereinspräsident Hartmut Haas geht es darum, Raum zu schaffen, damit ein vernünftiges Gespräch zwischen Religionen, Kulturen und Gesellschaft möglich wird und die Entstehung religiöser Ghettos verhindert wird. Es handle sich letztlich nicht um ein religiöses, sondern um ein gesellschaftliches Projekt.
Für den Kulturbeauftragten Christoph Reichenau besteht deshalb kein Zweifel, dass das Haus der Religionen auch tatsächlich gebaut und das Projekt realisiert wird - «sonst macht unsere Gesellschaft etwas falsch». Und wenn es trotz den bereits investierten Geldern doch noch schiefgehen sollte? «Dann geht es höchstens so schief wie mit dem Christkind», sagt der Präsident des Vereins «Haus der Religionen - Dialog der Kulturen». «Ein Gott gehört doch nicht in einen Stall und endet dann am Kreuz. Ist da etwas schiefgegangen? Die Idee jedenfalls lebt noch immer.»
Monika Rosenberg
Christmas Special With Blackadder (Rowan Atkinson) :-)
Part one
History lesson a la Blackaddaire..... :-)
Part two
History lesson a la Blackaddaire..... :-)
Part two
Donnerstag, Dezember 21, 2006
The expensive war
The $2 Trillion Dollar War
A leading economist says the true cost of Iraq is far higher than President Bush claims -- and America will pay the price for decades to come.
By Charles M. Young
12/20/06 "Rolling Stone" --- - When America invaded Iraq in 2003, the Bush administration predicted that the war would turn a profit, paying for itself with increased oil revenues. So far, though, Congress has spent more than $350 billion on the conflict, including the $50 billion appropriated for 2007.
But according to one of the world's leading economists, that is just a fraction of what Iraq will actually wind up costing American taxpayers. Joseph Stiglitz, winner of the Nobel Prize for economics, estimates the true cost of the war at$2.267 trillion. That includes the government's past and future spending for the war itself ($725 billion), health care and disability benefits for veterans ($127 billion), and hidden increases in defense spending ($160 billion). It also includes losses the economy will suffer from injured vets ($355 billion) and higher oil prices ($450 billion).
Stiglitz, a professor of economics at Columbia University, is just the guy to size up the war's financial consequences. He served as chief economist at the World Bank and chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors under President Clinton, and his book Globalization and Its Discontents has sold more than a million copies. Stiglitz sat down with Rolling Stone in New York to discuss the costs of Bush's misadventure in Iraq.
What's wrong with dropping a lot of money on the Iraq War? Didn't World War II pull America out of the Great Depression?
War is a lousy form of economic stimulus. The bang you get for the buck is very low. If we hadn't had to fight during the Depression, we would have become a much richer country by investing the money we spent on the war. Think of the Nepalese contractors doing work in Iraq. They spend their money in Iraq or Nepal -- not in America.
Because the war drove up oil prices, we are also giving more money to Saudi Arabia, Iran and Venezuela. It follows that we are not investing that money. And instead of spending the money we have left on things that will make us wealthier, we are spending it in ways that have just the opposite effect. I don't want to reduce this to cold, hard economics, but when you educate young people for twelve to eighteen years, you're investing a lot of money in them. If you then have them killed, maimed and debilitated, you destroy capital.
How did you arrive at the $2 trillion figure?
There were three parts to the calculations that I made with Linda Bilmes, a professor of public finance at Harvard. The first part is based on actual expenditures -- the impact on the federal budget. But the budget doesn't include a lot of expenditures we will be making in the future as a result of the war today, like paying for the health care and disability benefits of all the people who have been injured. These are lifetime expenditures, but they aren't included in the $600 million a year the Defense Department expects to spend on Iraq. They're just talking about the hardware of war.
The second part of our calculations estimates future expenditures to replace what we lose in the war. The budget includes spending for new ammunition, but not the wear and tear on weapons systems. Eventually the weapons must be replaced, but the administration doesn't count that as part of the projected cost of the war.
A third important category is a little more hidden. The defense budget has gone way up, beyond the money earmarked for Iraq. You have to ask why. It's not like the Cold War has broken out again. We infer that they are hiding a lot of the Iraq expenditures in the defense budget. We only attribute a small fraction of the increase to Iraq, but it would be hard to explain them any other way than the war.
You also examine the cost beyond the impact on the federal budget.
Yes. We look at where the budget underestimates the social cost of the war. Take disability pay. If you're wounded, the government pays you only twenty percent of what you would have earned if you could work. The disability payment is a budget cost, but the economy misses the salary you would have been making now that you're not able to do anything.
At least they saved taxpayers money on body armor.
Not really. Rumsfeld made the defense budget a little lower in the short term by not providing the troops with adequate body armor. But the government now has to pay for the care of vets with disabling brain and spine injuries -- and society loses what their contribution would have been had they been gainfully employed. It's a good illustration of how looking at the short-run number leads you to think the war isn't costing all that much. It's costing the government more, our society more and our veterans enormously more.
Another example of Rumsfeld's budgeting is the huge bonuses we're paying to get soldiers to re-enlist. He wanted to lessen the impact of the war on the military, so he used private contractors, who are more expensive. What he didn't realize was that he was setting up a competition that has driven up the price of a soldier. If someone who has served his enlistment has a choice of working as a contractor for $100,000 or in the military for $25,000, what's he going to do? Wages and bonuses had to go up. Maybe that's a good thing -- the regular military was being cheated, in a way. But it's another cost of the war that isn't figured into the budget.
So Bush's budget for the war is as out of touch with reality as his justifications for invading Iraq in the first place.
The administration is trying to sell the notion that they have repealed the laws of economics. They want us to believe that we don't have to choose between guns and butter -- that we can have them both. The reality is, the money spent on the war could have been spent on other things.
Such as?
One quarter of the war budget would have fixed Social Security for the next seventy-five years. George Bush says that Social Security is a major economic problem. If you believe him -- although there are many reasons not to believe him -- the war is four times worse as an economic problem.
With $2 trillion, we could have funded the entire world's commitment to foreign aid to poor countries for the next twenty years. Or just think what we could have done to stop global warming if we had spent that two trillion developing cheaper photovoltaic cells to convert solar energy into electricity. With our technological advantages, we could have had some real breakthroughs. We have the resources -- we just need to redirect them from destroying another country.
Will average Americans notice any economic fallout from the war?
We'll have a lower living standard than we otherwise would have achieved. The median American income is going down. Most of us are worse off than we were five or six years ago. Why are we getting poorer? This big pot of money we spent on the war obviously has something to do with it. Americans have a hard time seeing it when the numbers come out in dribs and drabs. But when it's $2 trillion? Did we really want to spend it like this? It's hard to think how we could have spent it worse.
Has Bush responded to your calculations?
To my knowledge, nobody in the administration has challenged our numbers. All they've said is that we didn't include the benefits of the war, which is true. There is no way to assess the benefits. There are some little savings we subtracted out, such as the no-fly zone over Iraq: We don't have to pay to patrol it any more, because there is nothing to enforce with Saddam out of power. But the administration can't exactly claim that they have brought peace, stability and democracy to the Middle East.
They also argue that they didn't go to war on the basis of green-eyeshade calculations. That's true, but they did do a calculation of the cost. They were just off. Like every other aspect of their analysis of this war, they were either deliberately misleading or incompetent.
Paul Wolfowitz actually claimed that the war would pay for itself with oil revenue.
You have to wonder: What reward should he receive for such acumen? Bush made him president of the World Bank.
A leading economist says the true cost of Iraq is far higher than President Bush claims -- and America will pay the price for decades to come.
By Charles M. Young
12/20/06 "Rolling Stone" --- - When America invaded Iraq in 2003, the Bush administration predicted that the war would turn a profit, paying for itself with increased oil revenues. So far, though, Congress has spent more than $350 billion on the conflict, including the $50 billion appropriated for 2007.
But according to one of the world's leading economists, that is just a fraction of what Iraq will actually wind up costing American taxpayers. Joseph Stiglitz, winner of the Nobel Prize for economics, estimates the true cost of the war at$2.267 trillion. That includes the government's past and future spending for the war itself ($725 billion), health care and disability benefits for veterans ($127 billion), and hidden increases in defense spending ($160 billion). It also includes losses the economy will suffer from injured vets ($355 billion) and higher oil prices ($450 billion).
Stiglitz, a professor of economics at Columbia University, is just the guy to size up the war's financial consequences. He served as chief economist at the World Bank and chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors under President Clinton, and his book Globalization and Its Discontents has sold more than a million copies. Stiglitz sat down with Rolling Stone in New York to discuss the costs of Bush's misadventure in Iraq.
What's wrong with dropping a lot of money on the Iraq War? Didn't World War II pull America out of the Great Depression?
War is a lousy form of economic stimulus. The bang you get for the buck is very low. If we hadn't had to fight during the Depression, we would have become a much richer country by investing the money we spent on the war. Think of the Nepalese contractors doing work in Iraq. They spend their money in Iraq or Nepal -- not in America.
Because the war drove up oil prices, we are also giving more money to Saudi Arabia, Iran and Venezuela. It follows that we are not investing that money. And instead of spending the money we have left on things that will make us wealthier, we are spending it in ways that have just the opposite effect. I don't want to reduce this to cold, hard economics, but when you educate young people for twelve to eighteen years, you're investing a lot of money in them. If you then have them killed, maimed and debilitated, you destroy capital.
How did you arrive at the $2 trillion figure?
There were three parts to the calculations that I made with Linda Bilmes, a professor of public finance at Harvard. The first part is based on actual expenditures -- the impact on the federal budget. But the budget doesn't include a lot of expenditures we will be making in the future as a result of the war today, like paying for the health care and disability benefits of all the people who have been injured. These are lifetime expenditures, but they aren't included in the $600 million a year the Defense Department expects to spend on Iraq. They're just talking about the hardware of war.
The second part of our calculations estimates future expenditures to replace what we lose in the war. The budget includes spending for new ammunition, but not the wear and tear on weapons systems. Eventually the weapons must be replaced, but the administration doesn't count that as part of the projected cost of the war.
A third important category is a little more hidden. The defense budget has gone way up, beyond the money earmarked for Iraq. You have to ask why. It's not like the Cold War has broken out again. We infer that they are hiding a lot of the Iraq expenditures in the defense budget. We only attribute a small fraction of the increase to Iraq, but it would be hard to explain them any other way than the war.
You also examine the cost beyond the impact on the federal budget.
Yes. We look at where the budget underestimates the social cost of the war. Take disability pay. If you're wounded, the government pays you only twenty percent of what you would have earned if you could work. The disability payment is a budget cost, but the economy misses the salary you would have been making now that you're not able to do anything.
At least they saved taxpayers money on body armor.
Not really. Rumsfeld made the defense budget a little lower in the short term by not providing the troops with adequate body armor. But the government now has to pay for the care of vets with disabling brain and spine injuries -- and society loses what their contribution would have been had they been gainfully employed. It's a good illustration of how looking at the short-run number leads you to think the war isn't costing all that much. It's costing the government more, our society more and our veterans enormously more.
Another example of Rumsfeld's budgeting is the huge bonuses we're paying to get soldiers to re-enlist. He wanted to lessen the impact of the war on the military, so he used private contractors, who are more expensive. What he didn't realize was that he was setting up a competition that has driven up the price of a soldier. If someone who has served his enlistment has a choice of working as a contractor for $100,000 or in the military for $25,000, what's he going to do? Wages and bonuses had to go up. Maybe that's a good thing -- the regular military was being cheated, in a way. But it's another cost of the war that isn't figured into the budget.
So Bush's budget for the war is as out of touch with reality as his justifications for invading Iraq in the first place.
The administration is trying to sell the notion that they have repealed the laws of economics. They want us to believe that we don't have to choose between guns and butter -- that we can have them both. The reality is, the money spent on the war could have been spent on other things.
Such as?
One quarter of the war budget would have fixed Social Security for the next seventy-five years. George Bush says that Social Security is a major economic problem. If you believe him -- although there are many reasons not to believe him -- the war is four times worse as an economic problem.
With $2 trillion, we could have funded the entire world's commitment to foreign aid to poor countries for the next twenty years. Or just think what we could have done to stop global warming if we had spent that two trillion developing cheaper photovoltaic cells to convert solar energy into electricity. With our technological advantages, we could have had some real breakthroughs. We have the resources -- we just need to redirect them from destroying another country.
Will average Americans notice any economic fallout from the war?
We'll have a lower living standard than we otherwise would have achieved. The median American income is going down. Most of us are worse off than we were five or six years ago. Why are we getting poorer? This big pot of money we spent on the war obviously has something to do with it. Americans have a hard time seeing it when the numbers come out in dribs and drabs. But when it's $2 trillion? Did we really want to spend it like this? It's hard to think how we could have spent it worse.
Has Bush responded to your calculations?
To my knowledge, nobody in the administration has challenged our numbers. All they've said is that we didn't include the benefits of the war, which is true. There is no way to assess the benefits. There are some little savings we subtracted out, such as the no-fly zone over Iraq: We don't have to pay to patrol it any more, because there is nothing to enforce with Saddam out of power. But the administration can't exactly claim that they have brought peace, stability and democracy to the Middle East.
They also argue that they didn't go to war on the basis of green-eyeshade calculations. That's true, but they did do a calculation of the cost. They were just off. Like every other aspect of their analysis of this war, they were either deliberately misleading or incompetent.
Paul Wolfowitz actually claimed that the war would pay for itself with oil revenue.
You have to wonder: What reward should he receive for such acumen? Bush made him president of the World Bank.
That lost war
The war is already lost
Ideological zealotry has helped destroy Iraq, revive the Taliban and increase the terror threat writes Tariq Ali in the Guardian.
By Tariq Ali
12/20/06 "The Guardian" -- -- Once a war goes badly wrong and its justifications are shown to be lies, to insist that a "democratic" Iraq is visible on the horizon and that "we must stay the course" becomes a total fantasy. What is to be done?
In the US a group of Foggy Bottom elders was wheeled in to prepare a report. This admitted what the whole world (Downing Street excepted) already knew: the occupation is a disaster and the situation gets more hellish every day. After US citizens voted accordingly in the mid-term elections, the White House sacrificed the Pentagon warlord, Donald Rumsfeld.
The warlord of Downing Street, however, is still at large, zombie-like in his denials that anything serious is wrong in Baghdad or Kabul. Everything, for him, can still be remedied by a dose of humanitarian medicine (a poison so powerful and audacious that no resistance is possible). His desperate attempts to play the statesman have made him a laughing stock in friendly Arab capitals and Baghdad's Green Zone. Iraq is the umbilical cord that ties him to his fate.
Meanwhile the old men in Washington recognise the scale of the disaster. Their descriptions are strong, their prescriptions weak and pathetic: "We agree with the goal of US policy in Iraq, as stated by the president: an Iraq that can govern itself, sustain itself and defend itself." Elsewhere they recommend a deal with Tehran and Damascus to preserve post-withdrawal stability, implying that Baghdad can never be independent again. It was left to a military realist, Lieutenant-General William Odom, to demand a complete withdrawal in the next few months, a view backed by Iraqis (Shia and Sunni) in successive polls. The occupation, Kofi Annan informs us, has created a much worse situation than under Saddam.
How different it was in the heady days that followed the capture of Baghdad. Two lines of argument emerged in the victorious camp. The Pentagon wanted a quick deal with Saddam's generals to establish a new regime so that US and subsidiary troops could withdraw to bases in northern Iraq and Kuwait to police the outcome. The state department and its Downing Street auxiliary wanted the ruthless application of "hard power" and a long occupation to establish a new Iraq as a model of US "soft power" for the entire region.
This was never a serious option. It is the unconditional US support for Israel that precludes any possibility of soft power in Iraq or elsewhere. Using Fatah to promote civil conflict in Palestine is unlikely to improve matters. Even the most pro-US Arab regimes in the region - Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf states, which do Washington's bidding - permit virulent denunciations of western policies in the media to keep their own citizens at bay.
None of the scenarios being canvassed in Washington, including by the Democrats, envisage a total US withdrawal. That is a defeat too unbearable to contemplate, but the war has already been lost, together with half a million Iraqi lives. Trying to delay the defeat (as in Vietnam) by sending in a "surge" of troops is unlikely to work.
The British parliament, even more supine than its US equivalent, voted against any official inquiry (not even a Hutton) on British involvement in the war, when they knew that a majority in the country was opposed to a continuation of this conflict. Blair's ideological zealotry has helped destroy Iraq, revive the Taliban in Afghanistan, increase the threat of terror in Britain and introduce repressive laws that were not enforced even in the second world war. His own wretched party and the opposition have acquiesced in these repellent measures. Time for a regime change at home.
Tariq Ali's latest book is Pirates of the Caribbean: Axis of Hope - tariq.ali3@btinternet.com
Ideological zealotry has helped destroy Iraq, revive the Taliban and increase the terror threat writes Tariq Ali in the Guardian.
By Tariq Ali
12/20/06 "The Guardian" -- -- Once a war goes badly wrong and its justifications are shown to be lies, to insist that a "democratic" Iraq is visible on the horizon and that "we must stay the course" becomes a total fantasy. What is to be done?
In the US a group of Foggy Bottom elders was wheeled in to prepare a report. This admitted what the whole world (Downing Street excepted) already knew: the occupation is a disaster and the situation gets more hellish every day. After US citizens voted accordingly in the mid-term elections, the White House sacrificed the Pentagon warlord, Donald Rumsfeld.
The warlord of Downing Street, however, is still at large, zombie-like in his denials that anything serious is wrong in Baghdad or Kabul. Everything, for him, can still be remedied by a dose of humanitarian medicine (a poison so powerful and audacious that no resistance is possible). His desperate attempts to play the statesman have made him a laughing stock in friendly Arab capitals and Baghdad's Green Zone. Iraq is the umbilical cord that ties him to his fate.
Meanwhile the old men in Washington recognise the scale of the disaster. Their descriptions are strong, their prescriptions weak and pathetic: "We agree with the goal of US policy in Iraq, as stated by the president: an Iraq that can govern itself, sustain itself and defend itself." Elsewhere they recommend a deal with Tehran and Damascus to preserve post-withdrawal stability, implying that Baghdad can never be independent again. It was left to a military realist, Lieutenant-General William Odom, to demand a complete withdrawal in the next few months, a view backed by Iraqis (Shia and Sunni) in successive polls. The occupation, Kofi Annan informs us, has created a much worse situation than under Saddam.
How different it was in the heady days that followed the capture of Baghdad. Two lines of argument emerged in the victorious camp. The Pentagon wanted a quick deal with Saddam's generals to establish a new regime so that US and subsidiary troops could withdraw to bases in northern Iraq and Kuwait to police the outcome. The state department and its Downing Street auxiliary wanted the ruthless application of "hard power" and a long occupation to establish a new Iraq as a model of US "soft power" for the entire region.
This was never a serious option. It is the unconditional US support for Israel that precludes any possibility of soft power in Iraq or elsewhere. Using Fatah to promote civil conflict in Palestine is unlikely to improve matters. Even the most pro-US Arab regimes in the region - Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf states, which do Washington's bidding - permit virulent denunciations of western policies in the media to keep their own citizens at bay.
None of the scenarios being canvassed in Washington, including by the Democrats, envisage a total US withdrawal. That is a defeat too unbearable to contemplate, but the war has already been lost, together with half a million Iraqi lives. Trying to delay the defeat (as in Vietnam) by sending in a "surge" of troops is unlikely to work.
The British parliament, even more supine than its US equivalent, voted against any official inquiry (not even a Hutton) on British involvement in the war, when they knew that a majority in the country was opposed to a continuation of this conflict. Blair's ideological zealotry has helped destroy Iraq, revive the Taliban in Afghanistan, increase the threat of terror in Britain and introduce repressive laws that were not enforced even in the second world war. His own wretched party and the opposition have acquiesced in these repellent measures. Time for a regime change at home.
Tariq Ali's latest book is Pirates of the Caribbean: Axis of Hope - tariq.ali3@btinternet.com
Nichts Menschliches soll einem fremd sein... aber gleich so? :-)
Ok, nicht die zuverlässigste Quelle aber unterhaltsam irgendwie, Tja die Deutschen, und wir lassen von denen auch noch so viele rein... :-)
Blick online:
STUTTGART – Viel perverser gehts nicht: Eine 69-jährige Oma treibt Sado-Maso-Spiele mit ihrem Schwiegersohn (66). Dabei bringt sie ihn fast um – und muss nun hinter Gitter.
Sado-Maso-Oma muss in den Knast
20.12.2006 | 20:44:14
Der arme Richter im Schwabenland wird sich gefragt haben, in welch billiger Soap Opera er da wohl gelandet sei. Doch der Fall ist keine Farce, sondern traurige Wirklichkeit: Ein 66-jähriger deutscher Anwalt trieb es mit seiner Schwiegermama (69). Und zwar nicht im Ehebett, sondern im Swingerklub. Mit Sado-Maso-Spielen. Wie «Bild» weiss, zahlte der Anwalt die heissen Sessions der scharfen Oldtimer – und Schwiegermama bekam zum Dank gar noch ein neues Gebiss!
Das mag nun alles nicht extrem moralisch sein, doch vor dem Richter hätte diese Geschichte nicht enden müssen. Dafür sorgte erst die rüstige Dame, indem sie ihren Schwiegersohn bei einer Fesselsession beinahe umbrachte.
Sie fesselte den Mann ihrer Tochter für einmal zu Hause an einen Stuhl. Wegen irgendetwas gerieten sich die beiden dann in die Haare. Die Rentnerin übertrieb es als Domina ziemlich mit dem gewalttätigen Teil der Sexpraktik: Fünf Minuten lang hat sie gemäss Anklage den Anwalt mit einer Schnur gewürgt, ihm einen Lampenständer achtmal über den Kopf gezogen und ihm Finger in die Nasenlöcher gesteckt.
Am Ende lag der gute Mann blutend auf dem Boden. Wo ihn sein Sohn fand. Hat der sich wohl gefragt, in was für eine Familie er hineingeboren wurde, als Papa röchelte, Oma habe ihn so zugerichtet?
Der Richter fand das Familien-Drama gar nicht lustig und verknurrte die Sado-Maso-Dame zu dreieinhalb Jahren Knast. Sie habe im Zorn ernsthaft versucht, den Schwiegersohn zu erdrosseln, und seinen Tod in Kauf genommen.
Des Anwalts Frau, eine 47-jährige Opernsängerin mit riesiger blonder Mähne, hat ihrem Gatten mittlerweile verziehen. Doch ob Oma jemals wieder mit der Familie unter dem Weihnachtsbaum «Stille Nacht» wird singen dürfen?
Blick online:
STUTTGART – Viel perverser gehts nicht: Eine 69-jährige Oma treibt Sado-Maso-Spiele mit ihrem Schwiegersohn (66). Dabei bringt sie ihn fast um – und muss nun hinter Gitter.
Sado-Maso-Oma muss in den Knast
20.12.2006 | 20:44:14
Der arme Richter im Schwabenland wird sich gefragt haben, in welch billiger Soap Opera er da wohl gelandet sei. Doch der Fall ist keine Farce, sondern traurige Wirklichkeit: Ein 66-jähriger deutscher Anwalt trieb es mit seiner Schwiegermama (69). Und zwar nicht im Ehebett, sondern im Swingerklub. Mit Sado-Maso-Spielen. Wie «Bild» weiss, zahlte der Anwalt die heissen Sessions der scharfen Oldtimer – und Schwiegermama bekam zum Dank gar noch ein neues Gebiss!
Das mag nun alles nicht extrem moralisch sein, doch vor dem Richter hätte diese Geschichte nicht enden müssen. Dafür sorgte erst die rüstige Dame, indem sie ihren Schwiegersohn bei einer Fesselsession beinahe umbrachte.
Sie fesselte den Mann ihrer Tochter für einmal zu Hause an einen Stuhl. Wegen irgendetwas gerieten sich die beiden dann in die Haare. Die Rentnerin übertrieb es als Domina ziemlich mit dem gewalttätigen Teil der Sexpraktik: Fünf Minuten lang hat sie gemäss Anklage den Anwalt mit einer Schnur gewürgt, ihm einen Lampenständer achtmal über den Kopf gezogen und ihm Finger in die Nasenlöcher gesteckt.
Am Ende lag der gute Mann blutend auf dem Boden. Wo ihn sein Sohn fand. Hat der sich wohl gefragt, in was für eine Familie er hineingeboren wurde, als Papa röchelte, Oma habe ihn so zugerichtet?
Der Richter fand das Familien-Drama gar nicht lustig und verknurrte die Sado-Maso-Dame zu dreieinhalb Jahren Knast. Sie habe im Zorn ernsthaft versucht, den Schwiegersohn zu erdrosseln, und seinen Tod in Kauf genommen.
Des Anwalts Frau, eine 47-jährige Opernsängerin mit riesiger blonder Mähne, hat ihrem Gatten mittlerweile verziehen. Doch ob Oma jemals wieder mit der Familie unter dem Weihnachtsbaum «Stille Nacht» wird singen dürfen?
Viel britische Ohnmacht im Nahen Osten
Viel britische Ohnmacht im Nahen Osten
Skepsis über Blairs Aussenpolitik wegen des Iraks und Bush
Die Nahostreise von Premierminister Blair ist in den britischen Medien auf grosse Skepsis gestossen. Ein Londoner Institut hat gleichzeitig eine generelle Kritik an Blairs Aussenpolitik publiziert. Sie bezieht sich auf den Irak-Krieg, die Hörigkeit gegenüber Bush und die Vernachlässigung europäischer Koordination.
20. Dezember 2006, Neue Zürcher Zeitung
Mr. London, 19. Dezember
Der britische Premierminister Blair hat eine fünftägige Reise in den Nahen Osten am Dienstag mit einem Besuch in den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten abgeschlossen. Neben dem bilateralen Handel (100 000 Briten arbeiten dort) ging es um die Pflege von Beziehungen mit einer muslimischen, arabischen und gemässigten Macht. Die Rolle der gemässigten arabischen Staaten muss sich aber erst noch erweisen. Aber auch die sofortige Parteinahme Blairs - und der Europäischen Union sowie der USA - für die umstrittene Ansetzung von vorzeitigen Neuwahlen in Palästina durch Präsident Abbas, mit dem Blair in Ramallah zusammengetroffen war, reihte sich in diese Logik ein, obwohl es sich um eine unsichere und möglicherweise kontraproduktive Initiative handelt.
Zurückkrebsen auf der ganzen Linie
Es hätte für Blair nicht schlechter laufen können. Von Brüssel aus traf er in Ankara ein, wo er den Entscheid der Europäischen Union zur teilweisen Aussetzung der Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Türkei nur als «schweren Fehler» bezeichnen konnte. Aber selbst in London blieb nicht unbemerkt, dass es vor allem die Vereinigten Staaten waren, welche aus Eigeninteresse auf die EU Druck, der zum Teil als ungebührlich empfunden wurde, für den Beitritt der muslimischen Grenzmacht ausgeübt hatten.
Die Ankunft in Bagdad wurde überschattet von der wachsenden Gewissheit, dass Präsident Bush den Baker-Plan nicht akzeptieren würde. Gegen die Linie von Blair, der ständig noch fiktive Abzugdaten für die britischen Truppen im Süden verbreiten lässt, scheint er zunächst eine Aufstockung amerikanischer Truppen zu beabsichtigen. Blair musste selbst seinen eigenen Vorschlag, mit Syrien und Iran im Rahmen einer regionalen Diplomatie über den Irak zu verhandeln, vorübergehend wieder beerdigen.
Sprachlose Aussenministerin
Selbst wenn Blair mit seiner nicht neuen und auch nicht unbedingt zutreffenden, jedenfalls aber erfolglosen Forderung an Bush, erst den Konflikt zwischen Israel und Palästina als ein permanentes Grundübel in der explosiven Region für eine allgemeine Befriedung zu lösen, recht gehabt hätte - der palästinensische Bruderkrieg machte ihm, als er am Montag und Dienstag in Ramallah und Israel weilte, einen Strich durch die Rechnung.
Man kann sich den Ärger in Downing Street und im britischen Aussenministerium vorstellen, als gleichzeitig am Dienstagmorgen das Chatham House, ein angesehenes, auf internationale Analysen spezialisiertes Institut, auf konzisen sechs Seiten eine letztlich vernichtende, wenn auch differenzierte Kritik an der Aussenpolitik von Blair veröffentlichte. Der Aussenministerin Beckett verschlug es buchstäblich die Sprache, als sie von der BBC dazu befragt wurde. Sie sprach von «lächerlichen» Bemerkungen unter dem Niveau des Instituts und bestritt jeglichen Verlust von britischem Einfluss im Nahen Osten, gegenüber den USA und innerhalb der Europäischen Union. Sie bestätigte letztlich nur, dass Blair selbst seit ihrem Amtsantritt für die Aussenpolitik zuständig ist.
Einseitige und persönliche Abhängigkeit
Der Ende Jahr abtretende Direktor des Instituts, der Politologe Bulmer-Thomas, fasste dabei nur etwas ungewollt bösartig, weil konzentriert, zusammen, was pensionierte Diplomaten, anonyme Beamte des Aussenministeriums, frustrierte Militärs und die Medien schon lange angeprangert hatten. Nach einem eher positiven aussenpolitischen Start beim Regierungsantritt 1997 hatten sich die globalen, multilateralen, humanitären und ökologischen Initiativen von Blair abgeschwächt. Blair war zwar charismatisch und missionarisch und hatte gewisse Erfolge mit dem Kyoto-Protokoll und der Afrika-Kampagne am G-8-Gipfel 2005 in Schottland. Aber die Terroranschläge vom September 2001 in den USA und der nachfolgende Irak-Krieg ab 2003 brachten ihn in eine selbstverschuldete und derart enge, auch persönliche Abhängigkeit von Präsident Bush, dass er sowohl britische Interessen aus den Augen verlor als auch die Koordination mit einer Europäischen Union, die ihrerseits heillos über ihre neue Verfassung und das Irak-Engagement zerstritten war. Der Bericht räumt allerdings ein, dass weder ein geeintes Europa noch Grossbritannien allein eine Chancen gehabt hätten, auf die inneren Machtkämpfe in Washington zwischen Weissem Haus, dem Vizepräsidenten, den wechselnden Aussenministern und dem Pentagon mit eigenen Ideen einzuwirken.
Nicht mehr einflussreich genug
Aber er wirft Blair vor, trotz eigenen Informationen (etwa über die nie gefundenen Massenvernichtungswaffen) den «schrecklichen Fehler» des Krieges gegen Saddam Hussein gemacht und den britischen Einfluss auf Washington sträflich überschätzt zu haben. Letzteres hätte man seit der Suez-Krise vor 50 Jahren eigentlich wissen müssen. Blair habe die Administration Bush in keinerlei Weise nennenswert beeinflussen können, trotz den eigenen militärischen, politischen und finanziellen Opfern. Die vor allem seit Churchill und Roosevelt gepflegte «special relationship» wäre demnach eine britische Illusion geblieben - was sowohl von offiziösen britischen wie amerikanischen Quellen immer wieder offen eingeräumt wird.
Blairs Nachfolger, schliesst der Bericht, müsse nach der «Wasserscheide» des Irak-Krieges einen neuen Ausgleich zwischen Europa und den USA suchen, wobei man sich aber nicht - was die Tories zurzeit tun - gleichzeitig sowohl von der Union wie von den USA distanzieren könne. Ein engeres Bekenntnis von Grossbritannien zu Europa, welches das seit langem proeuropäische Chatham House verlangt, läge dagegen auch im Interesse der USA. Allerdings wird in dem Bericht nicht gesagt, dass die Mehrheit der Briten - trotz den Annäherungsbemühungen von Blair zu Beginn seiner Amtszeit - der EU weiterhin skeptisch bis ablehnend gegenübersteht.
Skepsis über Blairs Aussenpolitik wegen des Iraks und Bush
Die Nahostreise von Premierminister Blair ist in den britischen Medien auf grosse Skepsis gestossen. Ein Londoner Institut hat gleichzeitig eine generelle Kritik an Blairs Aussenpolitik publiziert. Sie bezieht sich auf den Irak-Krieg, die Hörigkeit gegenüber Bush und die Vernachlässigung europäischer Koordination.
20. Dezember 2006, Neue Zürcher Zeitung
Mr. London, 19. Dezember
Der britische Premierminister Blair hat eine fünftägige Reise in den Nahen Osten am Dienstag mit einem Besuch in den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten abgeschlossen. Neben dem bilateralen Handel (100 000 Briten arbeiten dort) ging es um die Pflege von Beziehungen mit einer muslimischen, arabischen und gemässigten Macht. Die Rolle der gemässigten arabischen Staaten muss sich aber erst noch erweisen. Aber auch die sofortige Parteinahme Blairs - und der Europäischen Union sowie der USA - für die umstrittene Ansetzung von vorzeitigen Neuwahlen in Palästina durch Präsident Abbas, mit dem Blair in Ramallah zusammengetroffen war, reihte sich in diese Logik ein, obwohl es sich um eine unsichere und möglicherweise kontraproduktive Initiative handelt.
Zurückkrebsen auf der ganzen Linie
Es hätte für Blair nicht schlechter laufen können. Von Brüssel aus traf er in Ankara ein, wo er den Entscheid der Europäischen Union zur teilweisen Aussetzung der Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Türkei nur als «schweren Fehler» bezeichnen konnte. Aber selbst in London blieb nicht unbemerkt, dass es vor allem die Vereinigten Staaten waren, welche aus Eigeninteresse auf die EU Druck, der zum Teil als ungebührlich empfunden wurde, für den Beitritt der muslimischen Grenzmacht ausgeübt hatten.
Die Ankunft in Bagdad wurde überschattet von der wachsenden Gewissheit, dass Präsident Bush den Baker-Plan nicht akzeptieren würde. Gegen die Linie von Blair, der ständig noch fiktive Abzugdaten für die britischen Truppen im Süden verbreiten lässt, scheint er zunächst eine Aufstockung amerikanischer Truppen zu beabsichtigen. Blair musste selbst seinen eigenen Vorschlag, mit Syrien und Iran im Rahmen einer regionalen Diplomatie über den Irak zu verhandeln, vorübergehend wieder beerdigen.
Sprachlose Aussenministerin
Selbst wenn Blair mit seiner nicht neuen und auch nicht unbedingt zutreffenden, jedenfalls aber erfolglosen Forderung an Bush, erst den Konflikt zwischen Israel und Palästina als ein permanentes Grundübel in der explosiven Region für eine allgemeine Befriedung zu lösen, recht gehabt hätte - der palästinensische Bruderkrieg machte ihm, als er am Montag und Dienstag in Ramallah und Israel weilte, einen Strich durch die Rechnung.
Man kann sich den Ärger in Downing Street und im britischen Aussenministerium vorstellen, als gleichzeitig am Dienstagmorgen das Chatham House, ein angesehenes, auf internationale Analysen spezialisiertes Institut, auf konzisen sechs Seiten eine letztlich vernichtende, wenn auch differenzierte Kritik an der Aussenpolitik von Blair veröffentlichte. Der Aussenministerin Beckett verschlug es buchstäblich die Sprache, als sie von der BBC dazu befragt wurde. Sie sprach von «lächerlichen» Bemerkungen unter dem Niveau des Instituts und bestritt jeglichen Verlust von britischem Einfluss im Nahen Osten, gegenüber den USA und innerhalb der Europäischen Union. Sie bestätigte letztlich nur, dass Blair selbst seit ihrem Amtsantritt für die Aussenpolitik zuständig ist.
Einseitige und persönliche Abhängigkeit
Der Ende Jahr abtretende Direktor des Instituts, der Politologe Bulmer-Thomas, fasste dabei nur etwas ungewollt bösartig, weil konzentriert, zusammen, was pensionierte Diplomaten, anonyme Beamte des Aussenministeriums, frustrierte Militärs und die Medien schon lange angeprangert hatten. Nach einem eher positiven aussenpolitischen Start beim Regierungsantritt 1997 hatten sich die globalen, multilateralen, humanitären und ökologischen Initiativen von Blair abgeschwächt. Blair war zwar charismatisch und missionarisch und hatte gewisse Erfolge mit dem Kyoto-Protokoll und der Afrika-Kampagne am G-8-Gipfel 2005 in Schottland. Aber die Terroranschläge vom September 2001 in den USA und der nachfolgende Irak-Krieg ab 2003 brachten ihn in eine selbstverschuldete und derart enge, auch persönliche Abhängigkeit von Präsident Bush, dass er sowohl britische Interessen aus den Augen verlor als auch die Koordination mit einer Europäischen Union, die ihrerseits heillos über ihre neue Verfassung und das Irak-Engagement zerstritten war. Der Bericht räumt allerdings ein, dass weder ein geeintes Europa noch Grossbritannien allein eine Chancen gehabt hätten, auf die inneren Machtkämpfe in Washington zwischen Weissem Haus, dem Vizepräsidenten, den wechselnden Aussenministern und dem Pentagon mit eigenen Ideen einzuwirken.
Nicht mehr einflussreich genug
Aber er wirft Blair vor, trotz eigenen Informationen (etwa über die nie gefundenen Massenvernichtungswaffen) den «schrecklichen Fehler» des Krieges gegen Saddam Hussein gemacht und den britischen Einfluss auf Washington sträflich überschätzt zu haben. Letzteres hätte man seit der Suez-Krise vor 50 Jahren eigentlich wissen müssen. Blair habe die Administration Bush in keinerlei Weise nennenswert beeinflussen können, trotz den eigenen militärischen, politischen und finanziellen Opfern. Die vor allem seit Churchill und Roosevelt gepflegte «special relationship» wäre demnach eine britische Illusion geblieben - was sowohl von offiziösen britischen wie amerikanischen Quellen immer wieder offen eingeräumt wird.
Blairs Nachfolger, schliesst der Bericht, müsse nach der «Wasserscheide» des Irak-Krieges einen neuen Ausgleich zwischen Europa und den USA suchen, wobei man sich aber nicht - was die Tories zurzeit tun - gleichzeitig sowohl von der Union wie von den USA distanzieren könne. Ein engeres Bekenntnis von Grossbritannien zu Europa, welches das seit langem proeuropäische Chatham House verlangt, läge dagegen auch im Interesse der USA. Allerdings wird in dem Bericht nicht gesagt, dass die Mehrheit der Briten - trotz den Annäherungsbemühungen von Blair zu Beginn seiner Amtszeit - der EU weiterhin skeptisch bis ablehnend gegenübersteht.
Mittwoch, Dezember 20, 2006
End of the strongmen
12/19/06 "Information Clearing House" -- -- The era of the Middle East strongman, propped up by and enforcing Western policy, appears well and truly over. His power is being replaced with rule by civil war, apparently now the American Administration’s favoured model across the region.
End of the strongmen
Do America and Israel want the Middle East engulfed by civil war?
By Jonathan Cook in Nazareth
Fratricidal fighting is threatening to engulf, or already engulfing, the occupied Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Iraq. Both Syria and Iran could soon be next, torn apart by attacks Israel is reportedly planning on behalf of the US. The reverberations would likely consume the region.
Western politicians like to portray civil war as a consequence of the West’s failure to intervene more effectively in the Middle East. Were we more engaged in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or more aggressive in opposing Syrian manipulations in Lebanon, or more hands-on in Iraq, the sectarian fighting could be prevented. The implication being, of course, that, without the West’s benevolent guidance, Arab societies are incapable of dragging themselves out of their primal state of barbarity.
But in fact, each of these breakdowns of social order appears to have been engineered either by the United States or by Israel. In Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq, sectarian difference is less important than a clash of political ideologies and interests as rival factions disagree about whether to submit to, or resist, American and Israeli interference. Where the factions derive their funding and legitimacy from -- increasingly a choice between the US or Iran -- seems to determine where they stand in this confrontation.
Palestine is in ferment because ordinary Palestinians are torn between their democratic wish to see Israeli occupation resisted -- in free elections they showed they believed Hamas the party best placed to realise that goal -- and the basic need to put food on the table for their families. The combined Israeli and international economic siege of the Hamas government, and the Palestinian population, has made a bitter internal struggle for control of resources inevitable.
Lebanon is falling apart because the Lebanese are divided: some believe that the country’s future lies with attracting Western capital and welcoming Washington’s embrace, while others regard America’s interest as cover for Israel realising its long-standing design to turn Lebanon into a vassal state, with or without a military occupation. Which side the Lebanese choose in the current stand-off reflects their judgment of how plausible are claims of Western and Israeli benevolence.
And the slaughter in Iraq is not simply the result of lawlessness -- as is commonly portrayed -- but also about rival groups, the nebulous “insurgents”, employing various brutal and conflicting strategies: trying to oust the Anglo-American occupiers and punish local Iraqis suspected of collaborating with them; extracting benefits from the puppet Iraqi regime; and jockeying for positions of influence before the inevitable grand American exit.
All of these outcomes in Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq could have been foreseen -- and almost certainly were. More than that, it looks increasingly like the growing tensions and carnage were planned. Rather than an absence of Western intervention being the problem, the violence and fragmentation of these societies seems to be precisely the goal of the intervention.
Evidence has emerged in Britain that suggests such was the case in Iraq. Testimony given by a senior British official to the 2004 Butler inquiry investigating intelligence blunders in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq was belatedly published last week, after attempts by the Foreign Office to hush it up.
Carne Ross, a diplomat who helped to negotiate several UN security council resolutions on Iraq, told the inquiry that British and US officials knew very well that Saddam Hussein had no WMDs and that bringing him down would lead to chaos.
“I remember on several occasions the UK team stating this view in terms during our discussions with the US (who agreed)," he said, adding: “At the same time, we would frequently argue, when the US raised the subject, that ‘regime change’ was inadvisable, primarily on the grounds that Iraq would collapse into chaos.”
The obvious question, then, is why would the US want and intend civil war raging across the Middle East, apparently threatening strategic interests like oil supplies and the security of a key regional ally, Israel?
Until the presidency of Bush Jnr, the American doctrine in the Middle East had been to install or support strongmen, containing them or replacing them when they fell out of favour. So why the dramatic and, at least ostensibly, incomprehensible shift in policy?
Why allow Yasser Arafat’s isolation and humiliation in the occupied territories, followed by Mahmoud Abbas’s, when both could have easily been cultivated as strongmen had they been given the tools they were implicitly promised by the Oslo process: a state, the pomp of office and the coercive means to impose their will on rival groups like Hamas? With almost nothing to show for years of concessions to Israel, both looked to the Palestinian public more like lapdogs rather than rottweilers.
Why make a sudden and unnecessary fuss about Syria’s interference in Lebanon, an interference that the West originally encouraged as a way to keep the lid on sectarian violence? Why oust Damascus from the scene and then promote a “Cedar Revolution” that pandered to the interests of only one section of Lebanese society and continued to ignore the concerns of the largest and most dissatisfied community, the Shia? What possible outcome could there be but simmering resentment and the threat of violence?
And why invade Iraq on the hollow pretext of locating WMDs and then dislodge its dictator, Saddam Hussein, who for decades had been armed and supported by the US and had very effectively, if ruthlessly, held Iraq together? Again from Carne’s testimony, it is clear that no one in the intelligence community believed Saddam really posed a threat to the West. Even if he needed “containing” or possibly replacing, as Bush’s predecessors appeared to believe, why did the president decide simply to overthrow him, leaving a power void at Iraq’s heart?
The answer appears to be related to the rise of the neocons, who finally grasped power with the election of President Bush. Israel’s most popular news website, Ynet, recently observed of the neocons: “Many are Jews who share a love for Israel.”
The neocons’ vision of American global supremacy is intimately tied to, and dependent on, Israel’s regional supremacy. It is not so much that the neocons choose to promote Israel’s interests above those of America as that they see the two nations’ interests as inseparable and identical.
Although usually identified with the Israeli right, the neocons’ political alliance with the Likud mainly reflects their support for adopting belligerent means to achieve their policy goals rather than the goals themselves.
The consistent aim of Israeli policy over decades, from the left and right, has been to acquire more territory at the expense of its neighbours and entrench its regional supremacy through “divide and rule”, particularly of its weakest neighbours such as the Palestinians and the Lebanese. It has always abominated Arab nationalism, especially of the Baathist variety in Iraq and Syria, because it appeared immune to Israeli intrigues.
For many years Israel favoured the same traditional colonial approach the West used in the Middle East, where Britain, France and later the US supported autocratic leaders, usually from minority populations, to rule over the majority in the new states they had created, whether Christians in Lebanon, Alawites in Syria, Sunnis in Iraq, or Hashemites in Jordan. The majority was thereby weakened, and the minority forced to become dependent on colonial favours to maintain its privileged position.
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, for example, was similarly designed to anoint a Christian strongman and US stooge, Bashir Gemayel, as a compliant president who would agree to an anti-Syrian alliance with Israel.
But decades of controlling and oppressing Palestinian society allowed Israel to develop a different approach to divide and rule: what might be termed organised chaos, or the “discord” model, one that came to dominate first its thinking and later that of the neocons.
During its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Israel preferred discord to a strongman, aware that a pre-requisite of the latter would be the creation of a Palestinian state and its furnishing with a well-armed security force. Neither option was ever seriously contemplated.
Only briefly under international pressure was Israel forced to relent and partially adopt the strongman model by allowing the return of Yasser Arafat from exile. But Israel’s reticence in giving Arafat the means to assert his rule and suppress his rivals, such as Hamas, led inevitably to conflict between the Palestinian president and Israel that ended in the second intifada and the readoption of the discord model.
This latter approach exploits the fault lines in Palestinian society to exacerbate tensions and violence. Initially Israel achieved this by promoting rivalry between regional and clan leaders who were forced to compete for Israel’s patronage. Later Israel encouraged the emergence of Islamic extremism, especially in the form of Hamas, as a counterweight to the growing popularity of the secular nationalism of Arafat’s Fatah party.
Israel’s discord model is now reaching its apotheosis: low-level and permanent civil war between the old guard of Fatah and the upstarts of Hamas. This kind of Palestinian in-fighting usefully depletes the society’s energies and its ability to organise against the real enemy: Israel and its enduring occupation.
The neocons, it appears, have been impressed with this model and wanted to export it to other Middle Eastern states. Under Bush they sold it to the White House as the solution to the problems of Iraq and Lebanon, and ultimately of Iran and Syria too.
The provoking of civil war certainly seemed to be the goal of Israel’s assault on Lebanon over the summer. The attack failed, as even Israelis admit, because Lebanese society rallied behind Hizbullah’s impressive show of resistance rather than, as was hoped, turning on the Shia militia.
Last week the Israeli website Ynet interviewed Meyrav Wurmser, an Israeli citizen and co-founder of MEMRI, a service translating Arab leaders’ speeches that is widely suspected of having ties with Israel’s security services. She is also the wife of David Wurmser, a senior neocon adviser to Vice-President Dick Cheney.
Meyrav Wurmser revealed that the American Administration had publicly dragged its feet during Israel’s assault on Lebanon because it was waiting for Israel to expand its attack to Syria.
“The anger [in the White House] is over the fact that Israel did not fight against the Syrians … The neocons are responsible for the fact that Israel got a lot of time and space … They believed that Israel should be allowed to win. A great part of it was the thought that Israel should fight against the real enemy, the one backing Hizbullah. It was obvious that it is impossible to fight directly against Iran, but the thought was that its [Iran’s] strategic and important ally [Syria] should be hit.”
Wurmser continued: “It is difficult for Iran to export its Shiite revolution without joining Syria, which is the last nationalistic Arab country. If Israel had hit Syria, it would have been such a harsh blow for Iran that it would have weakened it and [changed] the strategic map in the Middle East.”
Neocons talk a great deal about changing maps in the Middle East. Like Israel’s dismemberment of the occupied territories into ever-smaller ghettos, Iraq is being severed into feuding mini-states. Civil war, it is hoped, will redirect Iraqis’ energies away from resistance to the US occupation and into more negative outcomes.
Similar fates appear to be awaiting Iran and Syria, at least if the neocons, despite their waning influence, manage to realise their vision in Bush’s last two years.
The reason is that a chaotic and feuding Middle East, although it would be a disaster in the view of most informed observers, appears to be greatly desired by Israel and its neocon allies. They believe that the whole Middle East can be run successfully the way Israel has run its Palestinian populations inside the occupied territories, where religious and secular divisions have been accentuated, and inside Israel itself, where for many decades Arab citizens were “de-Palestinianised” and turned into identity-starved and quiescent Muslims, Christians, Druze and Bedouin.
That conclusion may look foolhardy, but then again so does the White House’s view that it is engaged in a “clash of civilisations” which it can win with a “war on terror”.
All states are capable of acting in an irrational or self-destructive manner, but Israel and its supporters may be more vulnerable to this failing than most. That is because Israelis’ perception of their region and their future has been grossly distorted by the official state ideology, Zionism, with its belief in Israel’s inalienable right to preserve itself as an ethnic state; its confused messianic assumptions, strange for a secular ideology, about Jews returning to a land promised by God; and its contempt for, and refusal to understand, everything Arab or Muslim.
If we expect rational behaviour from Israel or its neocon allies, more fool us.
Jonathan Cook is a writer and journalist based in Nazareth, Israel. His book, “Blood and Religion: The Unmasking of the Jewish and Democratic State” is recently published by Pluto Press. His website is www.jkcook.net
End of the strongmen
Do America and Israel want the Middle East engulfed by civil war?
By Jonathan Cook in Nazareth
Fratricidal fighting is threatening to engulf, or already engulfing, the occupied Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Iraq. Both Syria and Iran could soon be next, torn apart by attacks Israel is reportedly planning on behalf of the US. The reverberations would likely consume the region.
Western politicians like to portray civil war as a consequence of the West’s failure to intervene more effectively in the Middle East. Were we more engaged in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or more aggressive in opposing Syrian manipulations in Lebanon, or more hands-on in Iraq, the sectarian fighting could be prevented. The implication being, of course, that, without the West’s benevolent guidance, Arab societies are incapable of dragging themselves out of their primal state of barbarity.
But in fact, each of these breakdowns of social order appears to have been engineered either by the United States or by Israel. In Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq, sectarian difference is less important than a clash of political ideologies and interests as rival factions disagree about whether to submit to, or resist, American and Israeli interference. Where the factions derive their funding and legitimacy from -- increasingly a choice between the US or Iran -- seems to determine where they stand in this confrontation.
Palestine is in ferment because ordinary Palestinians are torn between their democratic wish to see Israeli occupation resisted -- in free elections they showed they believed Hamas the party best placed to realise that goal -- and the basic need to put food on the table for their families. The combined Israeli and international economic siege of the Hamas government, and the Palestinian population, has made a bitter internal struggle for control of resources inevitable.
Lebanon is falling apart because the Lebanese are divided: some believe that the country’s future lies with attracting Western capital and welcoming Washington’s embrace, while others regard America’s interest as cover for Israel realising its long-standing design to turn Lebanon into a vassal state, with or without a military occupation. Which side the Lebanese choose in the current stand-off reflects their judgment of how plausible are claims of Western and Israeli benevolence.
And the slaughter in Iraq is not simply the result of lawlessness -- as is commonly portrayed -- but also about rival groups, the nebulous “insurgents”, employing various brutal and conflicting strategies: trying to oust the Anglo-American occupiers and punish local Iraqis suspected of collaborating with them; extracting benefits from the puppet Iraqi regime; and jockeying for positions of influence before the inevitable grand American exit.
All of these outcomes in Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq could have been foreseen -- and almost certainly were. More than that, it looks increasingly like the growing tensions and carnage were planned. Rather than an absence of Western intervention being the problem, the violence and fragmentation of these societies seems to be precisely the goal of the intervention.
Evidence has emerged in Britain that suggests such was the case in Iraq. Testimony given by a senior British official to the 2004 Butler inquiry investigating intelligence blunders in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq was belatedly published last week, after attempts by the Foreign Office to hush it up.
Carne Ross, a diplomat who helped to negotiate several UN security council resolutions on Iraq, told the inquiry that British and US officials knew very well that Saddam Hussein had no WMDs and that bringing him down would lead to chaos.
“I remember on several occasions the UK team stating this view in terms during our discussions with the US (who agreed)," he said, adding: “At the same time, we would frequently argue, when the US raised the subject, that ‘regime change’ was inadvisable, primarily on the grounds that Iraq would collapse into chaos.”
The obvious question, then, is why would the US want and intend civil war raging across the Middle East, apparently threatening strategic interests like oil supplies and the security of a key regional ally, Israel?
Until the presidency of Bush Jnr, the American doctrine in the Middle East had been to install or support strongmen, containing them or replacing them when they fell out of favour. So why the dramatic and, at least ostensibly, incomprehensible shift in policy?
Why allow Yasser Arafat’s isolation and humiliation in the occupied territories, followed by Mahmoud Abbas’s, when both could have easily been cultivated as strongmen had they been given the tools they were implicitly promised by the Oslo process: a state, the pomp of office and the coercive means to impose their will on rival groups like Hamas? With almost nothing to show for years of concessions to Israel, both looked to the Palestinian public more like lapdogs rather than rottweilers.
Why make a sudden and unnecessary fuss about Syria’s interference in Lebanon, an interference that the West originally encouraged as a way to keep the lid on sectarian violence? Why oust Damascus from the scene and then promote a “Cedar Revolution” that pandered to the interests of only one section of Lebanese society and continued to ignore the concerns of the largest and most dissatisfied community, the Shia? What possible outcome could there be but simmering resentment and the threat of violence?
And why invade Iraq on the hollow pretext of locating WMDs and then dislodge its dictator, Saddam Hussein, who for decades had been armed and supported by the US and had very effectively, if ruthlessly, held Iraq together? Again from Carne’s testimony, it is clear that no one in the intelligence community believed Saddam really posed a threat to the West. Even if he needed “containing” or possibly replacing, as Bush’s predecessors appeared to believe, why did the president decide simply to overthrow him, leaving a power void at Iraq’s heart?
The answer appears to be related to the rise of the neocons, who finally grasped power with the election of President Bush. Israel’s most popular news website, Ynet, recently observed of the neocons: “Many are Jews who share a love for Israel.”
The neocons’ vision of American global supremacy is intimately tied to, and dependent on, Israel’s regional supremacy. It is not so much that the neocons choose to promote Israel’s interests above those of America as that they see the two nations’ interests as inseparable and identical.
Although usually identified with the Israeli right, the neocons’ political alliance with the Likud mainly reflects their support for adopting belligerent means to achieve their policy goals rather than the goals themselves.
The consistent aim of Israeli policy over decades, from the left and right, has been to acquire more territory at the expense of its neighbours and entrench its regional supremacy through “divide and rule”, particularly of its weakest neighbours such as the Palestinians and the Lebanese. It has always abominated Arab nationalism, especially of the Baathist variety in Iraq and Syria, because it appeared immune to Israeli intrigues.
For many years Israel favoured the same traditional colonial approach the West used in the Middle East, where Britain, France and later the US supported autocratic leaders, usually from minority populations, to rule over the majority in the new states they had created, whether Christians in Lebanon, Alawites in Syria, Sunnis in Iraq, or Hashemites in Jordan. The majority was thereby weakened, and the minority forced to become dependent on colonial favours to maintain its privileged position.
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, for example, was similarly designed to anoint a Christian strongman and US stooge, Bashir Gemayel, as a compliant president who would agree to an anti-Syrian alliance with Israel.
But decades of controlling and oppressing Palestinian society allowed Israel to develop a different approach to divide and rule: what might be termed organised chaos, or the “discord” model, one that came to dominate first its thinking and later that of the neocons.
During its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Israel preferred discord to a strongman, aware that a pre-requisite of the latter would be the creation of a Palestinian state and its furnishing with a well-armed security force. Neither option was ever seriously contemplated.
Only briefly under international pressure was Israel forced to relent and partially adopt the strongman model by allowing the return of Yasser Arafat from exile. But Israel’s reticence in giving Arafat the means to assert his rule and suppress his rivals, such as Hamas, led inevitably to conflict between the Palestinian president and Israel that ended in the second intifada and the readoption of the discord model.
This latter approach exploits the fault lines in Palestinian society to exacerbate tensions and violence. Initially Israel achieved this by promoting rivalry between regional and clan leaders who were forced to compete for Israel’s patronage. Later Israel encouraged the emergence of Islamic extremism, especially in the form of Hamas, as a counterweight to the growing popularity of the secular nationalism of Arafat’s Fatah party.
Israel’s discord model is now reaching its apotheosis: low-level and permanent civil war between the old guard of Fatah and the upstarts of Hamas. This kind of Palestinian in-fighting usefully depletes the society’s energies and its ability to organise against the real enemy: Israel and its enduring occupation.
The neocons, it appears, have been impressed with this model and wanted to export it to other Middle Eastern states. Under Bush they sold it to the White House as the solution to the problems of Iraq and Lebanon, and ultimately of Iran and Syria too.
The provoking of civil war certainly seemed to be the goal of Israel’s assault on Lebanon over the summer. The attack failed, as even Israelis admit, because Lebanese society rallied behind Hizbullah’s impressive show of resistance rather than, as was hoped, turning on the Shia militia.
Last week the Israeli website Ynet interviewed Meyrav Wurmser, an Israeli citizen and co-founder of MEMRI, a service translating Arab leaders’ speeches that is widely suspected of having ties with Israel’s security services. She is also the wife of David Wurmser, a senior neocon adviser to Vice-President Dick Cheney.
Meyrav Wurmser revealed that the American Administration had publicly dragged its feet during Israel’s assault on Lebanon because it was waiting for Israel to expand its attack to Syria.
“The anger [in the White House] is over the fact that Israel did not fight against the Syrians … The neocons are responsible for the fact that Israel got a lot of time and space … They believed that Israel should be allowed to win. A great part of it was the thought that Israel should fight against the real enemy, the one backing Hizbullah. It was obvious that it is impossible to fight directly against Iran, but the thought was that its [Iran’s] strategic and important ally [Syria] should be hit.”
Wurmser continued: “It is difficult for Iran to export its Shiite revolution without joining Syria, which is the last nationalistic Arab country. If Israel had hit Syria, it would have been such a harsh blow for Iran that it would have weakened it and [changed] the strategic map in the Middle East.”
Neocons talk a great deal about changing maps in the Middle East. Like Israel’s dismemberment of the occupied territories into ever-smaller ghettos, Iraq is being severed into feuding mini-states. Civil war, it is hoped, will redirect Iraqis’ energies away from resistance to the US occupation and into more negative outcomes.
Similar fates appear to be awaiting Iran and Syria, at least if the neocons, despite their waning influence, manage to realise their vision in Bush’s last two years.
The reason is that a chaotic and feuding Middle East, although it would be a disaster in the view of most informed observers, appears to be greatly desired by Israel and its neocon allies. They believe that the whole Middle East can be run successfully the way Israel has run its Palestinian populations inside the occupied territories, where religious and secular divisions have been accentuated, and inside Israel itself, where for many decades Arab citizens were “de-Palestinianised” and turned into identity-starved and quiescent Muslims, Christians, Druze and Bedouin.
That conclusion may look foolhardy, but then again so does the White House’s view that it is engaged in a “clash of civilisations” which it can win with a “war on terror”.
All states are capable of acting in an irrational or self-destructive manner, but Israel and its supporters may be more vulnerable to this failing than most. That is because Israelis’ perception of their region and their future has been grossly distorted by the official state ideology, Zionism, with its belief in Israel’s inalienable right to preserve itself as an ethnic state; its confused messianic assumptions, strange for a secular ideology, about Jews returning to a land promised by God; and its contempt for, and refusal to understand, everything Arab or Muslim.
If we expect rational behaviour from Israel or its neocon allies, more fool us.
Jonathan Cook is a writer and journalist based in Nazareth, Israel. His book, “Blood and Religion: The Unmasking of the Jewish and Democratic State” is recently published by Pluto Press. His website is www.jkcook.net
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